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Abstract: The dual self-model of self-control with one-period lived short-run selves is 
excessively sensitive to the timing of shocks and to the interpolation of additional “no-
action” time periods in between the dates when decisions are made. We show that when 
short-run selves have a random length of time this excess sensitivity goes away. We 
consider  both  linear  and  convex  cost  of  self-control  models,  illustrating  the  theory 
through  a  series  of  examples.  We  examine  when  opportunities  to  consume  will  be 
avoided or delayed; we consider the way in which the marginal interest declines with 
delay, and we examine how preference “reversals” depend on the timing of information.  
To accommodate the combination of short time periods and convex costs of self control 
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1. Introduction 
Models of long-run planning and short-run impulsive selves provide a quantitative 
explanation of a wide variety of “behavioral” paradoxes, including the Rabin paradox 
(small stakes risk aversion), the Allais paradox, preferences for commitment in menu 
choice,  violations  of  the  weak  axiom  of  revealed  preference,  non-exponential 
discounting, and the effect of cognitive load on decision making and reversals due to 
probabilistic  rewards.  However,  these  models,  like  the  quasi-hyperbolic  discounting 
model,  have  a  fixed  horizon  for  the  short-run  self,  and  so  they  cannot  explain 
overwhelming evidence that the length of delay has a continuous impact on decisions. 
These models also make implausible predictions about the value of a commitment that 
avoids temptation:  If the commitment can be made “the period before” the temptation 
would be faced, it is essentially costless, while the commitment is valueless if it must be 
made in the same period that the temptation would occur.  
As an  example of the  continous effect of delay, consider  an experiment from 
Myerson and Green [1995]. Subjects were asked to state how much hypothetical money 
t c  they would need right now to make the indifferent to receiving a hypothetical $1,000 
after a delay of length t . By considering several different delays  1 2 , t t  and so forth, we 
can impute marginal interest rate to the subjects, and with standard geometric discounting 
these marginal interest rates should be time invariant. In the Myerson and Green data, 
these marginal interest rates are
1  
                                                 
1 Andersen et al [2008] find evidence of a smaller but still monotone gradual decline of interest rate with 
delay when real financial incentives are provided and adjustments are made for curvature; Benhabib et al 
[2010] also find evidence of a gradual monotone decline using (small) cash rewards. Since Keren and 
Roelsofsma [1995] have already found (in hypothetical experiments) that agents intertemporal choices are 
closer to geometric discounting when rewards are stochastic it is not clear how much of the difference 






In the long-run/short-run self model with a fixed period length, or in the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model, the initial marginal interest rate may be high. However, 
these models predict that all subsequent marginal interest rates are equal and low, as 
opposed to the gradual decay seen in the data. 
To account for the continuous effect of delay, and to explore the implications of 
the timing of decisions, we suppose that the short-run self or selves are not completely 
myopic and do value future utility, but less so than the long-run self, either because there 
is a succession of short-run selves with random lifetimes, or a single short-run self whose 
discount factor is lower than that of the long-run self.  This enables us to maintain the 
underlying strength and simplicity of the dual-self model and its ability to account for 
many phenomenon, while accounting for the continuous effect of delay. It also lets us  
model cases where agents are tempted by future consumption, as in Noor [2007], and 
explain why this temptation is most significant with respect to payoffs that are relatively 
soon. 
The  key  modeling  question  in  extending  the  dual-self  model  to  non-myopic  
short-run selves is the specification of the cost of self control. In the one-period model 
this cost depends on the amount of utility the short run player foregoes in the current 
period. When short run players have a longer horizon, their expectations about future 
payoffs can matter as well, and we suppose that the control cost of implementing a given 
action  depends  on  how much  that  action  lowers the  highest  possible  average  present 
value the short-run self could obtain from the current period on. This specification is 
consistent  with  the  interpretation  that  the  short-run  selves  are  strategically  naïve  and 
evaluate foregone utility assuming that no self control will be used in the future. 
We begin our analysis with the case where the cost of self control is linear in the 
foregone value. This is the simplest version of the model, and the one closest to the 
standard  case,  as  it  is  consistent  with  both  the  independence  axiom  for  choices  over 
lotteries  and  the  weak  axiom  of  revealed  preference.  Our  first  application  is  to  the 
decision of whether to accept or reject a “simple temptation”  that gives an initial positive 
payoff followed by a negative payoff in future periods.  We point out that the agent may 




and prefer to give in when the temptation must be faced in every period unless and until it 
is accepted; we relate this to the effect of “bundling” of decisions noted by Ainslie [2001] 
and Kirby and Guatsello [2001]. In Example 2 we show that the model explains the 
Myerson-Green data mentioned above, and in Example 3 we explain Della Vigna et al’s 
[2010] finding that the people who are willing to incur costs to avoid contributing to 
charity are the ones who would contribute less when avoidance is not possible.    
Although linear costs are a convenient first cut at self-control problems, there is 
considerable evidence that the costs are often convex, so that it is more than twice as hard 
to resist twice the temptation.  We therefore extend the model to allow for convex costs.  
In Example 4 we study the role of the short-run player’s effective horizon in determining 
when the agent will choose a menu that includes tempting choices and when the agent 
will prefer menus where these temptations are not available.  Examples 5 and 6 then  
point out two implications of convex costs for agents faced with simple temptations: first 
of all, an agent is more likely to resist a temptation that has low probability of being 
realized than one whose payoff stream is certain. Second, an agent who is faced with two 
simultaneous  simple  temptations  may  choose  to accept  one  of  them,  even  though  he 
would reject both if they were presented in different periods.   
This observation raises the following issues: First, when costs are convex and 
time periods are short, we expect that the non-linearity of control costs should “spill 
over” from a decision in one period to a subsequent decision soon afterwards, so that 
making  two  decisions  in  rapid  succession  is  similar  to  making  the  two  decisions 
simultaneously. Second, since the length of the time period is an artificial construct, we 
want the model to apply to cases where the “time periods” are very short, with decisions 
made in only a few of them. Adding such “intermediate” no-action periods makes no 
difference in classic rational models, but can have counterintuitive implications in models 
of self control. To capture the effect of changing the period length when there are convex 
costs, we suppose that self-control uses cognitive resources  and these are a stock that can 
be depleted over short time intervals, as argued by Muraven et al [1998] and modeled by 
Ozdenoren  et  al  [2009].    From  this  perspective,  the  simpler  model  of  the  previous 
sections  corresponds  to  cases  where  the  stock  of  cognitive  resources  completely 




simply  subtracted  from  the  beginning  of  period  stock,  with  the  cost  of  self  control 
corresponding to the difference between the benefits obtained from the full stock and the 
benefits obtained after the reduction, so that a convex cost of self control corresponds to a 
concave benefit function.   
 The reason for introducing a stock of cognitive resources is to track variations in 
the marginal cost of self control and account for the way that using self control in one 
period can alter the self control cost and decision in a subsequent one.  To check that this 
is all it is doing, we first show in Theorem 5 that when there is a single decision, the 
stock of cognitive resources is irrelevant, as the agent’s decision will be the same as in a 
“state-free”  model  with  the  appropriately  defined  cost  function.    We  then  show  in 
Theorem 6 that when the marginal cost of self control is constant, the decisions made by 
an agent with a stock of cognitive resources that partially replenishes over time are again 
the same as those made in an associated model without cognitive resources behavior can 
be modeled without the use of the cognitive resources . 
However when the agent makes multiple decisions and the marginal cost of self 
control varies then the equivalence with the state-free model fails, precisely because of 
the link between current decisions and the marginal cost of self control in future periods. 
In general, there are three possible sources of non-linearity in the model, any of which 
can cause variations in the marginal cost of self-control: the way the stock of cognitive 
resources is depleted by using self-control; the way the stock is replenished over time; 
and way the stock provides benefits. However, since cognitive resources are not observed 
directly and have no natural units, there are many equivalent representations of the same 
preferences. Theorem 8 shows that that if there is any replenishment at all, it is without 
loss of generality to specify linear replenishment and lodge all of the non-linearity in the 
depletion and benefit functions. 
After  exploring  the  general  properties  of  the  cognitive  resources  model,  we 
consider a number of examples with linear depletion and linear (or no) replenishment.  
Example 8 revisits the example of an agent with convex costs facing two temptations in a 
row, and shows that when resources replenish linearly the agent makes the same choice 
whether  the  two  decisions  are  made  exactly  simultaneously  or  in  rapid  succession. 




control is convex) it may be optimal to resist a persistent temptation for a while and then 
take it, a conclusion that is impossible in the stationary model without a stock variable.  
Example 10 builds on this by adding the option to pay a fee and permanently avoid the 
temptation. We show that it may be optimal to resist for a while and then pay the fee, 
which is consistent with the findings of a suggestive recent experiment of Houser et al 
[2010].  Examples 9 and 10 simplify by assuming no replenishment of resources at all, 
which is unrealistic but makes it easier to highlight the logic of the argument. Example 11 
re-examines the persistent temptation from example 9 with a general depletion function 
to highlight how the depletion and benefit function interact to determine whether the 
agent  will  resist  for  a  while  before  giving  in.  Finally,  Example  12  shows  the  issues 
involved in relaxing our assumption that the “willpower technology” is fixed and cannot 
be changed by the agent. 
In the first part of the paper we directly assume an objective function with a cost 
of self-control or benefit from cognitive resources. In Section 7 we show that when we 
rule out the kind of endogenous changes in willpower explored in Example 12, we can 
derive the objective function from a game in which a benevolent but patient long-run self 
faces a sequence of short-run selves who live for a random length of time. In this game 
decisions are made by the short-run selves, but the long-run self can alter the preferences 
of the short-run selves by undertaking “self-control” actions that in general lower the 
utility of the short-run self. 
While this paper is the first to study random short-run player lifetimes in a self-
control model, some past work has used the device of random long-run player lifetimes 
to explain behavioral anomalies: Dasgupta and Maskin [2005] show that uncertain long-
run player lifetimes can lead to hyperbolic discounting. Halevy [2008] develops a model 
where a single long run self faces a stopping (or death) risk that is modified by a convex 
“transformation function” and so is distinct from the agent’s pure time preference. He 
uses  this  to  explain  Keren  and  Roelofsma’s  [1995]  data,  which  shows  that  “present-




rewards  are  uncertain.
2  Epper,  Fehr-Duda,  and  Bruhin  [2009]  use  a  similar  idea  of 
distorted survival weights to explain present bias as a consequence of prospect theory.  
Noor [2007] develops axioms for a two-period choice problem in which the agent 
can  be  tempted  by  future  consumption.  His  model,  like  that  of  Gul  and  Pesendorfer 
[2001], is more general than ours in relating the temptation values to the objectives of the 
long run player, but less general in imposing the independence axiom and not developing 
the model’s recursive extension, and he does not investigate how this “temptation by the 
future” depends on the real time between the two periods of his model. His main goal is 
to show that there can be a self-control problem despite the fact that future temptation 
results  in  little  demand  for  commitment.  This  is  connected  to  our  example  of  menu 
choices with patient short-lived selves. Also in the context of two-period models, Noor 
and Takeoka [2010] develop axioms for choices on menus that correspond to convex 
costs of self control, Brocas and Carrillo [2008] explain the covariance of effort and 
consumption by assuming the long-rub self has incomplete information on the short-run 
self’s  cost  of  effort,  and  Chaterjee  and  Samuelson  [2009]  and  Dekel,  Lipman  and 
Rustichini [2009] axiomatize cases where second period preferences are stochastic and 
can depend on the first period choice of menu.
3 For the infinite horizon problem Gul and 
Pesendorfer [2004] develop a recursive extension of their [2001] axioms, including the 
independence axiom.  
2. The Decision Problem 
In dual-self models, the agent acts to maximize expected discounted utility subject 
to a cost of self control that is derived from the preferences of a more impulsive “short 
run self.”  In most of the paper we take this control cost as exogenous; Section 7 shows 
how this maximization problem corresponds to the equilibrium of a game between the 
agent’s “long-run self” and a sequence of short-run selves. To facilitate the exposition 
and also the comparison of the model with previous work, we will use a discrete-time 
model,  with  periods  1,2, n = ….    We  denote  the  agent’s  discount  factor  by  δ,  and 
                                                 
2 Our [2010] paper explains the same data as a consequence of a convex cost of self control.  




suppose that the discount factor of the short-run self is δµ, where  [0,1) µ ∈  can also be 
interpreted as the survival probability of the current short-run selves.  
We will frequently be interested in how the solution to the model varies with the 
period length, which we would like to distinguish from the real time between decisions. 
To  do  this  we  let  the  period  length  be  τ   units  of  calendar  time,  and  suppose  that 
exp( ) δ ρτ = − and  exp( ) µ ητ = − ; for small  τ we will make use of the approximations  
1 µ ητ ≈ − ,  1 r δ τ ≈ − .  
The space of states, denoted Y , is a measurable subset of a finite-dimensional 
Euclidean space, as is the space of actions A. For each state there is a measurable subset 
of feasible actions  ( ) n A y A ⊆  and at least one measurable map  : a Y A →  that satisfies 
( ) ( ) n n a y A y ∈ .  Dynamics  are  Markovian,  and  described  by  a  probability  distribution 
over  states  next  period  conditioned  by  the  current  state  and  action  according  to  a 
stochastic kernel  1 1 ( , )[ ] n n n y a dy π − −  which is a measurable function of  1 1 , n n y a − − . 
Each period’s action is taken after that period’s state is known, so the history of 
play  at  period  n   is  1 1 1 1 ( , , , , , ) n n n n h y a y a y − − = … ;  the  initial  history  1 1 h y =   is 
exogenously given. A strategy or plan for the long-run self is then a measurable map  a  
from histories to actions, so that for each history  n h  the strategy specifies an action in 
( ) ( ) n n h A y ∈ a .  
The short-run self (or selves) have get utility  ( , ) n n u y a  in period n  if the action 
n a  is taken in the state  n y . We will work with average present values, so that as we 
consider time periods of various length τ  we hold   ( , ) n n u y a  fixed. The objective of the 
long run player is the average present value of these short-run self utilities minus a cost of 
self control that is defined with reference to the maximum possible average present value 
for the short-run players. To define this maximum we first define the expected average 
present value of the short-run players.  Let  , n h Ea  be the conditional expectation generated 
by the plan  a  and the stochastic kernel, conditional on the history  n h . The expected 
average present value of the short-run self from period n  on  under a  is given by  
  , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
n n h n n U h E u y a δµ δµ
∞
+ + = ≡ − ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ , 




  ( ) ( )
, 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
n n h n n U h E e e u y a ρ η τ ρ η τ ∞ − + − +
+ + ≡ − ∑ a a ￿
￿ ￿ ￿= . 
 
In order to focus on the application of the model and not standard technical details 
we directly impose the following assumption. 
Assumption SR0: 
, , 0 0 (1 ) ( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
n n h n n h n n E u y a E u y a δµ δµ δµ δµ
∞ ∞
+ + + + = = − = − ∑ ∑ a a
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ l  
(the expectation and sum operators can be interchanged) and  ( , ) n U h a  has a maximum 
for each n  and  n h . 
Because the problem of the short-run self is Markov, this maximized utility only 
depends on the state: 
Theorem 1: max ( , ) ( ) n n U h U y = a a  
 
Our earlier work  [2006, 2010] on single-period lived short-run selves assumed 
that the cost of self control depends on the amount of utility foregone by the short-run 
player,  which  is  the  difference  between  the  maximum  possible  utility  in  the  current 
period and the utility the short-run player actually receives. When short-run players live 
more than one period, we must specify how the foregone utility takes into account the 
effect of current actions on future payoffs. To do this we suppose that the temptation 
utility used as a benchmark is the highest present value this short run player could hope to 
receive. 
Specifically,  we  call  ( ) n U y   the  temptation  value  for  the  short-run  self  at  n  
starting at state  n y  The foregone value is then  
  ( ) 1 1 1 ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( ) ( | , ))[ ] n n n n n n n n n n
Y
y a U y u y a U y y y a dy δµ δµ π + + + ∆ = − − + ∫ . 
The foregone value is recursive in sense that it depends on the future only through the 
future temptation utility, and attributes self-control costs to each action as it occurs as 
opposed to entire contingent plans. The key idea is that the current cost of self control 




action  n a   either  lowers  ( , ) n n u y a   or  changes  the  distribution  of  future  states 
1 ( | , ) n n n y y a π +  and thus the best utility the short-run self could hope to get in the future. 
Future actions that lead to less value than  ( ) n U y  incur costs at the time at which they are 
taken.  
One interpretation of the foregone value is that the term  
    1 1 1 ( ) ( | , ))[ ] n n n n n
Y
U y y y a dy δµ π + + + ∫  
is the short-run self’s prediction of the expected continuation payoff, and that short-run 
self  predicts that no self control will be used in the future. Under this interpretation the 
short-run  self  is  strategically  naïve  and  does  not  anticipate  that  today’s  actions  can 
change the amount of self-control that will be used in the future.
4 
  Notice that by the principle of optimality any plan that solves max ( , ) n U h a a  must 
also solve the dynamic programming problems  
  1 1 1 max (1 ) ( , ) ( ) ( | , ))[ ]
n a n n n n n n n
Y
u y a U y y y a dy δµ δµ π + + + − + ∫ . 
Thus we have  
Theorem 2:  ( , ) 0 n n y a ∆ ≥ , and if ˆ argmax ( , ) n U h ∈ a a a  then  ˆ ( , ) 0 n n y a ∆ = . 
  The key element of the theory of self-control is the specification of the cost of 
exerting self-control. We study the linear case first. 
3. Linear Cost of Self Control 
We start our analysis with a particularly simple specification of the cost of self-
control: We suppose that the cost of self control is linear in the foregone value  ∆: it is 
given by  ( , )) n n y a Γ∆ , where as above ∆ is measured in units of average present value, 
and the scalar constant  0 Γ ≥  is independent of the state.  
The case of linear self-control costs has been the most widely studied. This type 
of self-control model satisfies the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms, including the independence 
axiom.  Moreover,  while  nonlinear  costs  are  important  in  many  applications,  many 
                                                 
4 Depending on the cost function, other interpretations are sometimes possible as well, for example in the 
case of linear costs (defined below), the definition of temptation utility is consistent with perfect foresight.  




insights still arise in the linear case. We examine increasing marginal cost of self-control 
in subsequent sections, along with the idea that willpower is a stock so that exercising 
self-control can increase the cost of self-control over the next few periods if periods are 
short. 
  The agent’s objective function is defined by the expected average present value of 
short-run utility net of the self-control cost   
  ( ) , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
n n h n n n n V h E u y a y a δ δ
∞
+ + + + = ≡ − − Γ∆ ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Note first that this reduces to the linear-costs version of Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006], [2010]) when  0 µ = .  Next, note that the foregone value ∆ is not normalized by 
1 δ − . This is in order that the limit as  0 τ →  be well behaved. To understand why, 
suppose a once and for all action is taken that lowers utility in every period by. This 
action has foregone value of  1 ∆ =  independent of period length, and its control cost is 
Γ regardless of period length. In contrast, an action that lowers utility by 1 for a single 
period but has no impact on future utilities has foregone value  1 δµ ∆ = −  and a cost of 
(1 ) δµ Γ − , which is very small when periods are short. If the long-run player undertakes 
an infinite sequence of such actions the overall cost is  (1 )/(1 ) δµ δ Γ − − , and for this 
reason long-term commitments will be more attractive than a series of short-term ones: It 
is cheaper to resist future temptations now than to resist them as they arise. Moreover, the 
cost of committing now to forego 1 util in every period from N on is 
1 ( )
N δµ
− Γ  and in 
particular is strictly decreasing in s , except in the case  0 µ = , where the short-run self 
views all future periods  1 N >  as equally far away. We illustrate these implications in 
Example 1 below.  
Note that the difference between the long-term and short-term commitments is 
most extreme in the case  0 µ = , where the long-term commitment is no more costly than 
any  of  the  one-period  delays.  The  difference  diminishes  as  1 µ → ,  holding  other 
parameters constant; when  1 µ =  the long-term commitment is just as costly as the series 
of short-term ones.  Finally, note that sending the time period  τ  to 0 sends  1 µ →  but 
changes other parameters as well: Lowering utility by 1 forever starting immediately still 
costs  Γ,  lowering  utility  by  1  forever  starting  at  real  time  / s N τ =   costs 




( )/ ρ η ρ Γ + . Thus the difference between the long-term commitment and the series of 
short-term ones stems not from the period length but from the greater impatience of the 
short-run self.  
  As  in  the  case  of  the  short-run  decision  problem,  we  assume  existence  of  a 
maximum: 
Assumption 0:  ( , ) n V h a  has a maximum for each  , n n h . 
  Notice that this is a Markov decision problem, so it has a Markov solution. That 
is, there is an optimal plan in which the choice of action depends only on the current state 
n y .   
   
Simple Temptations 
Several  of  our  examples  will  use  as  a  building  block  what  we  call  a  simple 
temptation, which is a choice between either utility 0 in every period or a flow of  0 g u >  
that is received for a number of periods  N , with  0 b u − <  forever after. This choice 
represents a stereotypical conflict between short run and long run preferences that is easy 
to adapt to varying period lengths and to embed in more complicated decision problems.  
The average present values S  for the short-run self and P  for the long-run self of 
this stream are (1 ( ) ) ( ) N N
g b u u δµ δµ − −  and  (1 ) N N
g b P u u δ δ = − − . Our interest lies 
in the case  0, 0 S P > <  so that the short-run self would like to take the temptation 
while the long-run self would prefer to reject it. This conflict arises because the short run 
self discounts future periods using discount factor δµ δ < , and will not be present if we 
send  µ to 1 holding all other parameters fixed. However, the reason for interest in the 
case of  µ near 1 is that it corresponds to very short periods. To analyze this case we fix 
the calendar length of time T  for which the favorable flow lasts, so that  / N T τ = . 
Then  when  N   is  an  integer  we  have ( ) ( ) (1 ) T T
g b S e u e u ρ η ρ η − + − + = − − ,  and 
(1 ) T T
g b P e u e u ρ ρ − − = − − , independent of τ , even though  1 e
ητ µ




Example 1:  Resisting Temptation with Linear Cost 
  To begin, consider a choice between accepting and rejecting a simple temptation 
in the first period, with no other choices to be made.  Then the temptation utility is S, so 
the cost of resisting temptation is  S −Γ , thus temptation will be resisted if  P S <−Γ . 
Next note that if the decision can be made at date 1 about whether to accept or reject the 
temptation  in  period n,  the  cost  of  resisting  is  ( )
nS δµ −Γ ,  so  the  temptation  will  be 
resisted  if  ( )
n n P S δ δµ <−Γ   or 
n P S µ <−Γ ;  thus    as  the  decision  concerns  events 
further in the future it become easier to resist.  
  Next suppose that the temptation is persistent: if it is resisted the same choice is 
faced  again  in  the  next  period.
5  This  model  describes  for  example  the  temptation  to 
consume a durable good such as a bottle of wine.  Once the agent consumes the substance 
it is gone, but if he does not consume, the substance is still there the next period,
6 then the 
problem is stationary; in the state  1 n y =  the best possible value for the short-run self is 
S and the best continuation if the temptation is resisted is  S δµ , so the foregone value  is 
(1 )S δµ ∆ = − ,  resisting  costs  (1 )S δµ Γ −   each  period,  so  resisting  is  optimal  if 
(1 ) (1 ) P S δ δµ − <−Γ − .  Consequently  the  persistent  temptation  is  “harder  to  resist” 
than the simple one, and when (1 )/(1 ) / 1 P S δµ δ − − > Γ > , the agent would choose 
to give in to a persistent temptation but resist a simple one. Under the same conditions, 
the agent would choose to face the simple temptation in the next period rather than face 
the persistent one.  This condition gets increasingly difficult to satisfy as  1 µ →  holding 
all other parameters fixed, which corresponds to sending the birth parameter η to 0.    
Since the main reason for large µ is that periods are short, it is more interesting to 
study the agent’s choice in the limit of short time periods. Here the agent gives in to the 
persistent  temptation  but  resists  the  simple  one  when  ( )/ / 1 P S ρ η ρ + > Γ >   or 
                                                 
5 We can formally model this by assuming that there are two states  {0,1} Y = , where  0 n y =  means that 
the temptation is not available, and  1 n y =  means that it is. In the state  0 n y =  no action is possible, 
( ) {0} n A y = ; in the state  1 n y =  the space of actions is  ( ) {0,1} n A y =  where  0 means to resist the 
temptation and  1 means to give in to the temptation. The transition probabilities in state  0 n y =  place 
probability 1 of remaining in that state,  (0 | , ) 1 n n y a π = , while in state  1 n y =  the transition probability 
depends on the action taken:  (0 | ,1) 1 n y π =  so that if the action is taken, the temptation is off the table, 
and  (0 | ,0) 0 n y π =  so that if the temptation is resisted it remains for next period. 




( ) S P S ρ η ρ ρ + Γ > > Γ .  This  last  equation  has  a  simple  interpretation:  P ρ   is  the 
value of postponing the negative payoff P for an interval dt , ( ) S ρ η + Γ  is the flow cost 
of resisting the persistent temptation, and  r S Γ  is the flow or average utility resulting 
from paying the one-time cost of  S Γ  to permanently avoid the temptation. 
  If declining the temptation in period  n  means that it will not arise again until 
period n + ￿ , the situation is intermediate between a persistent temptation ( 1 = ￿ ) and a 
simple one ( = ∞ ￿ .) Then the best continuation value if the option is resisted is ( ) S δµ
￿ , 
so  (1 ( ) )S δµ ∆ = −
￿ , and resisting forever costs 
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(1 ( ) )
















￿ ,  
so  resisting  is  optimal  if  | |/ (1 ( ) )/(1 ) P S δµ δ Γ > − −
￿ ￿ .  Consequently  resisting  is 
more  attractive  when  the  temptation  can  be  avoided  for  longer,  and  the  decision  of 
whether to take at once or resist forever is monotone in ￿:  There is some  ￿  (possibly 0 
or infinity) such that the optimum is to take at once if  < ￿ ￿  and resist forever if  > ￿ ￿ . 
Intuitively, this is because the short-run self is much less concerned about far-off events 
than the long-run player is, so the gap between the benefit of delay and the cost of buying 
off the short-run player is increasing in the delay length. If the decision is imminent, there 
is  not  much  point  in  trying  to  avoid  temptation  by  making  a  commitment,  as  the 
temptation  already  exists,  but  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  commit  now  to  resist  future 
temptations. This is related to Noor’s  [2007] point that agents may be tempted by future 
consumption;  the  additional  structure  of  our  model  lets  us  explain  how  this  effect 
depends on the real time between the various decisions as opposed to the period length 
per se. 
Finally consider an initial-period choice of whether to accept or reject K  simple 
temptations, the first one in period 1, the second in period  1 K + , the third in period 
1 2K +  and so forth.  If the agent is close to indifferent about whether to take the first 
temptation he will strictly prefer to reject the second if that decision could be made in 
period 1. For this reason an agent who would accept the simple temptations, may choose 




experiments of Kirby and Guatsello [2001] on the “bundling” of decisions.
7  Note that the  
once-and-for all decision to decline a simple temptation can be seen as a “bundle” of all 
of the “decline today” decisions, and in each case the agent prefers the bundle for the 
same reason, namely that he is less tempted by future rewards.  
Example 2: Declining Marginal Interest Rates 
Now we show how the model generates the sort of declining interest rates seen in 
the Myerson and Green data. We take utility to be linear in consumption and without 
further loss of generality we set ( ) u c c = .
8 We will compute the amount of consumption 
n c  that makes the long run self indifferent between a unit of consumption at time 1 and 
n c  units in period n ; we will then use this to compute effective marginal interest rates on 
consumption.  (In  the  Appendix  we  extend  this  to  the  interest  rate  used  at  time  1  to 
discount between any two periods n  and ￿, which is closer to the long-run player’s rate 
of time preference  ρ because future consumption is less tempting.) Observe that if the 
long-run self is indifferent between one unit now and  n c  units later then since  1 µ <  the 
initial short-run self strictly prefers one unit now. Hence the temptation is to consume 
now, which incurs no control cost, and provides utility 1 for an average present value of 
1 δ − . The initial short run self gets average present value of 1 δµ −  from consuming at 
time 1, and 
1 (1 )( )
n
n c δµ δµ
− −  from the delayed option, so the control cost of the delayed 
option  is  1 (1 )(1 ( ) ) n
n c δµ δµ − Γ − − .  Thus  the  utility  of  the  delayed  option  is 
1 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ( ) ) n n
n n c c δ δ δµ δµ − − − − Γ − − .  Equating  the  values  of  the  two  options  
determines the consumption level leading to indifference. 
  1 1 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ( ) ) n n
n n c c δ δ δ δµ δµ − − − = − − Γ − −  
  We can then solve for  n c  
                                                 
7 See also chapter 5 of Ainslie [2001]. Both Ainslie and Kirby and Guatsello report that merely telling 
subjects they will face the same decision in the future changes choices as well, which the stationary model 
of this section cannot explain. Note though that Kirby and Guatsello report a much smaller impact of this 
“suggested linking” than of actual linking, and that the instructions they used for suggested linking told 
subjects “the choice you make now is the best indication of how you will choose every time,” which  may 
have induced a spurious effect. 
8 Myerson and Green asked subjects about cash payoffs as opposed to consumption. Both dual-self and 
quasi-hyperbolic models need additional structure to explain why subjects (who presumably save) also 
view cash payoffs as tempting.  Our earlier papers explained this with endogenously-determined  “mental 




  1 1
1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )( )
n n n c
δ δµ
δ δ δµ δµ − −
− + Γ −
=
− + Γ −
 
Note that as  1 µ → , we have  1 1/ n
n c δ − → , which is the solution for a single agent 
without self control costs, and that as  0 µ →  we have  
  1 1
1 1 /(1 )
(1 )
n n n c
δ δ
δ δ δ − −





   To relate the model back to Myerson and Green we compute the instantaneous  
interest rate for consumption decisions  at real time t nτ =   rate by letting  the period 




















  +   = = + Γ −       
 
In this case the marginal interest rate, to a good approximation, is equal to the subjective 
interest rate of the long-run self, plus a term that declines exponentially at rate  η. In the 
case of a short-run self who lives exactly one period, that is,  0 µ =  or  η = ∞, the 
marginal interest rate declines after a single period to a constant equal to the subjective 
interest rate of the long-run self. However, for larger values of µ we get a more gradual 
decline, as we see in the data.
 10   
Example 3: Door-to-Door Sales 
This example has two decisions: First, whether to avoid a tempting opportunity, 
and second, whether to give in to temptation if it was not avoided.  (For concreteness, 
think of the avoidance activity as avoiding a door-to-door salesman.)   
                                                 
9 This is the same answer as in Fudenberg-Levine [2006] once  we correct for the difference between 
average and total present value: In Fudenberg-Levine temptations were measured with respect to total and 
not average utility so the linear coefficient γ  in that paper corresponds to  /(1 ) δ Γ −  here. 
10  The  Myerson-Green  data  reported  above  is  for  money  payments  and  consumption;  The  
Web  Appendix  explains  how  to  extend  the  model  to  allow  for  consumption  financed  by  income  and 
savings, and shows that for small income increments marginal interest rates are the same as in this linear 
model. Note that in the data the marginal interest rate declines, but not exponentially. However, if the 
aggregate is averaged over individuals with different exponential rates of decline, then it will not in fact 
decline exponentially. The individual data provided us by Myerson and Green is noisy, but more closely 
exponential  than  the  aggregate  data.  Note  also  that  the  exponential  rate  of  decline  follows  from  the 





The first point, which does not require that short run players can live more than a 
single period, is that costly self-control leads to a non-monotonicity: If the temptation is 
very high or very low then the opportunity will not be avoided but it may be avoided for 
intermediate levels of temptation.  The intuition is that when the opportunity is very good 
there is little conflict between the long-run and short-run self, so the opportunity should 
be taken advantage of and not avoided. When the opportunity is very bad, the short-run 
self will not indulge much in it, and so it is not worth paying a fixed cost for avoidance. 
However, in the intermediate case there may be a more severe conflict between long-run 
and  short-run  self,  so  the  long-run  self  may  choose  to  commit  in  order  to  avoid  the 
temptation.  
The second substantive point does rely on the short run players sometimes living 
more than one period: The appeal of the costly avoidance option depends on the time 
interval between the decision to avoid and when the temptation would arrive, because the  
current  short  run  self  is  less  willing  to  go  along  with  avoidance  when  the  possible 
temptation would arrive soon. 
The example is very simple and stylized. In period 1 a cost  0 F ≥  may be paid or 
not; think of it as not being at home when the salesman calls. If the cost is paid, the utility 
in all subsequent periods is 0. If the cost is not paid, then in period 2 a decision must be 
made on whether to purchase from the salesman. If the purchase is made the utility in 
period 2 is B, otherwise it is zero. In period 3 if the purchase was made it must be paid 
for, resulting in a disutility of  1 − . 
To solve the model recursively, we first compute temptation values in each period 
and state, and then compute the agent’s objective function. At that point all that is left is 
to solve the various inequalities to see when each action is best, which we do in the 
appendix. 
We begin by computing the temptation value in the last period in which action is 
possible, namely in period 2 when the avoidance cost has not been paid. Here the short-
run self’s average present value from doing nothing is zero, and that of purchasing is 
(1 )( ) B δµ δµ − − , so  2 (1 )max{0, } U B δµ δµ = − − .  In the initial state if F  is chosen 
the short-run self’s value is  (1 ) F δµ − − , while if it is not it short-run player value is  




If  0 B δµ − < , then also  0 B δ − <  so in period 2 the optimum is not to purchase, 
which incurs no cost of self-control.  
Now  suppose  0 B δµ − > .  Then  if  the  purchase  is  made  long-run  utility  is 
B δ − ;  if  the  long  run  player  chooses  not  to  purchase  he  incurs  temptation  cost  of 
(1 )( ) B δµ δµ Γ − − ,  so  the  purchase  will  be  made  in  period  2  when 
(1 )( ) (1 )( ) B B δ δ δµ δµ − − ≥ −Γ − − .  If the avoidance cost is paid in the first period, 
the short-run self’s average value is  (1 )F δµ − − , while the temptation value is  2 U δµ , so 
the average present value of avoidance is 
    ( )
( )
2 (1 ) (1 )




δ δµ δµ δµ δµ
− − − Γ − +
− − − Γ − + − −
 
and avoidance is optimal if this  is higher than the discounted average value of long-run 
player utility in period 2, which is max{(1 )( ), (1 )( )} B B δ δ δµ δµ − − −Γ − −   
Denote the strategy of not paying the avoidance cost and not purchasing as  0 a , of 
not paying the avoidance cost and purchasing as  1 a , and of paying the avoidance cost as 
F a . In the Appendix we prove the following characterization of the optimal decision 
rule:  





(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 (1 ))
F
δ δµ δ µ
δ δµ
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=
− + Γ −
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and  1 a  is optimal if  * B B ≥ . If  * F F ≤  then  
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and  0 a  is optimal for  B B ≤  ,  F a is  optimal for  B B B ≤ ≤ , and  1 a  is optimal for 
B B ≥ . 
Note that the RHS inequality in B B B ≤ ≤  gets harder to satisfy as  1 µ →  or 
as  0 Γ → . In the former case the interests of the short-run self are nearly aligned with 
those of the long-run self, while in the second the short-run self defers to the wishes of 
the long-run self. In either case, paying F  is just an expensive way to not buy. Paying a 
small F  is attractive as  0 µ →  as here the first SR self is not very tempted by the second 
period outcome so it is cheap to get him to agree to a commitment that will probably bind 
on the next self. 
  We can also use this example to illustrate the effect of changing the amount of 
time between the two decisions, while keeping other factors constant.  Taking the limit as 
0 τ →  we find  
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where the first line holds fixed calendar times  and the second assumes that the decisions 
are made in consecutive periods.  From this we see that it is not worth paying to commit 
when  the  two  decision  are  very  close  together;  what  matters  is  not  the  number  of 
“periods” between the decisions but the real time between them. 
DellaVigna et al [2010] conduct an experiment on door-to-door charitable fund-
raising. They find if an option to avoid the salesperson is available about a quarter of 
people make use of it, and that if the option is made cheaper by providing a “Do Not 
Disturb” check box nearly a third of people choose to avoid the salesperson. This is as 
our model predicts: the lower the  cost of avoidance, the more people will choose it.   
DellaVigna  et  al  also  find  that  those  who  choose  avoidance  are  concentrated  among 
people who donate less when avoidance is not possible. Whether this is the case in our 
model depends on the distribution of  B. If the lowest value of  B in the population is 
greater than or equal to  B, and the highest value exceeds B, then all those who would 




only some of those who would contribute choose avoidance; this is what DellaVigna et al 
find. On the other hand, if the highest value of B in the population is less than or equal to 
B while the lowest is below B our model predicts the opposite result. A more elaborate 
experiment could vary the value of  B more systematically – for example in the flier 
describing the visit, indicating that a level of matching funds are available (three dollars 
to the charity for every dollar you donate, for example). This would make it possible to 
test for the non-monotonicity in B that the model predicts. 
4. Convex Costs of Self Control 
We now consider a simple extension of the model of linear cost of self control by 
allowing the cost of self-control to be convex.   
Specifically, we assume that the objective function is defined by the expected 
average present value of short-run utility net of the self-control cost   
  ( ) , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( ( , ) )
n n h n n n n V h E u y a g y a δ δ
∞
+ + + + = ≡ − − ∆ ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
where we now assume that g  is a convex function. Allowing g   to be convex is 
important both in light of evidence from the psychology literature, and because in the 
standard dual-self model convex costs are known to explain  preference “reversals” that 
arise from failure of the independence axiom, as in the Allais paradox while  linear self 
control costs cannot, as they are consistent with the independence axiom.
11   
 
Example 4: Menu Dependent Choice  
In Fudenberg-Levine [2006] we showed how convex control costs can lead to 
menu-dependent choice in violation of the weak axiom of revealed preference. We now 
extend  that  example  to  study  the  role  of  the  short-run  player’s  effective  horizon,  as 
measured  by  1/(1 ) µ − ,  in  determining  when  the  agent  prefers  menus  that  include 
tempting choices and when the agent prefers more restrictive menus that exclude them. 
Consider the following three-period model of menu choice. In the original problem there 
                                                 
11 Noor and Takeoka [2010] weaken independence axiom in Gul-Pesendorfer axioms to allow non-linear 
control costs, and then develop axioms that correspond to control costs being convex. Since they work in a 




were three possible actions, broccoli b , frozen yogurt  y  and ice cream  i. In the first 
period a menu consisting of a subset of actions is chosen from a list of menus M . In the 
second period an action is chosen from the menu; the utility received in periods 2 and 3 
depends on the choicex , we denote it by  2 3 ( , )( ) u u x .  We are interested in the induced 
preferences  over  menus.  In  particular,  we  would  like  to  model  a  situation  where 
{ , } { } b y y ￿  and { , , } { , } b i y b i ￿ . Here the frozen yogurt is a “compromise” option that 
is appealing in the face of strong temptations but not when faced weaker ones. 
This is known from the work of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2001] to imply 
that the independence axiom is violated, and since our model with linear g  is a form of 
expected utility it follows that g  must be non-linear.   
In Fudenberg and Levine [2006] we showed that with a single period lived short-
run  self  ( 0 µ = )  and  utilities  2 3 ( , )( ) (0,100) u u b = ,  2 3 ( , )( ) (8,30) u u y = , 
2 3 ( , )( ) (14,0) u u i = ,  .9 δ = , and  2 ( ) .5 g u Gu = , and  1 G = that frozen yogurt is indeed 
an optimal compromise. We will now hold the vectors  2 3 ( , ) u u  fixed, and investigate how 
the preferences depend on the other parameters, with focus on the role of  µ and on the 
menus { } b  and { , } b i , ignoring the compromise choice { } y . 
When  0 µ =  there is no self control cost involved in choosing the first-period 
menu, so the long-run self can do no better than choose the menu { } b  that consists of the 
best long-run outcome; indeed this menu is the unique optimum. When  1 µ =  the long-
run and short-run selves agree on the rankings of both second period choices and first 
period menus; in particular { } { , } b b i ∼ .  
To  analyze  the  decision  for  intermediate  values  of  µ  we  start  at  the  end, 
examining the optimal choice from each menu. In the menu { , } b i  the short-run value of 
b  is (1 )100 δµ δµ − ; the short-run value of i is 14(1 ) δµ − . Suppose 14 100δµ >  so that 
i  is  the  temptation.  The  period-2  value  from  choosing  b   from  { , } b i   is  then 
( )
2 (1 ) 100 .5 (1 )(14 100 ) G δ δµ δµ − − − − . We assume that G  is large enough that this is 
negative, so that the optimum is to give in to temptation and choose i. 
Working back to period 1, we now consider the choice between the menu { , } b i   
and the menu  { } b . The temptation is  { , } b i , which has value (1 ) 4 δµ δµ − 1 , while  { } b  
gives the short-run player a value of  2 (1 )100( ) δµ δµ − . The agent’s value from { , } b i  is 




  ( )
( )
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
(1 ) 100 .5 (1 ) 4 (1 )100( )
(1 ) 100 .5 (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 )100( )
G
G
δ δ δµ δµ δµ δµ
δ δ δµ δµ δµ δµ
− − − 1 − − =
− − − 1 − −
 
Now set  .1 µ = ; note that 14 90µ >  so the short-run self prefers i to b .  
Substituting  .9 δ = ,  .09 δµ = , the value of { } b  is  2 2 2 8.1 .5 (.91) (.09) (14 8.19) G − −  and 
the value of { , } b i  is 1.26 so if G  is large enough then { , } b i  is preferred. Also for large 
G  we have  2 90 .5 (1 )(14 90 ) 0 G δµ µ − − − < , so i will be chosen from the menu { , } b i .  
Hence we have a non-monotonicity in  µ: for  0 µ = , the menu  { } b  is strictly 
preferred, and this remains true for all small enough neighborhood of  0 µ = . Similarly, 
for µ near .1, the menu { , } b i  is strictly preferred. And finally, for µ equal or close to 1, 
the two menus are indifferent.   
Note that between subjects we can in principle infer both µ and δ. For example, 
we might conduct an experiment in two stages. In the first stage, subjects are presented 
with intertemporal choices of the Green-Myerson type discussed in Example 1, and from 
this  we  can  infer  , µ δ   for  each  subject.
12  Then  in  the  second  stage  we  give  choices 
between menus with items that we think will create different degrees of temptation, such 
as the foods in this example. The theory predicts when we correlate the µ’s inferred from 
the first stage of the experiment we should observe a non-monotonocity in menu choices 
in the second stage. 
Example 5:  Stochastic Temptations 
  Another implication of convex control costs is that the agent is more likely to 
resist “stochastic temptations” than certain ones. This is the basis of the explanation of 
the Allais paradox in Fudenberg and Levine [2010]; we give a simpler illustration of the 
idea  here  using  simple  temptations.  When  faced  with  a  single,  and  certain,  simple 
temptation, with  0 S P > > , it is optimal to choose the temptation if  ( ) P g S > − . Now 
suppose that instead the agent is faced with the choice between an action which gives 
probability q  of the same simple temptation and complimentary probability 1 q −  of 0, 
or   resisting, with utility flow 0. Then resisting the temptation has foregone value qS, so 
                                                 
12 To avoid the additional complications required to explain temptation by money payoffs we could use 




resisting is optimal if   ( ) qP g qS − < , so when g  is convex it  may be optimal to give in 
to  the  certain  temptation  but    resist  the  smaller  one.  Note  moreover  that  the  same 
qualitative conclusion extends to the case where the agent learns in period 1 that she will 




so  the  agents  resists  a  lottery  that  gives  probability  q   of  the  temptation  if 
( )
1 1 ( ) n n q P g q S δ δµ − − − < , and it is possible for this inequality to hold for small q  but 
not larger ones.  At the same time, though, since there is less of a self-control problem 
about future decisions, increasing  n  makes it more likely that the agent resists for all 
values of  q . This is consistent with the data of Baucells and Heukamp [2010]: They 
found  that  36%  of  subjects  exhibited  preference  reversal  in  a  common-ratio  Allais 
paradox,  changing  from  the  safer  to  the  expected-value-maximizing  choice  when  the 
decision is less likely to matter, while only 22% of subjects exhibited this preference 
reversal when all payoffs were delayed by three months. Note finally that the dependence 
of the decision on q   holds in the case where the agent is initially uncertain whether she 
will face the certain temptation or the stochastic one – all that matters is that she knows 
which temptation she is facing at the moment she decides. 
Example 6: Two Tempting Choices 
We now consider a variation on Example 5, where instead of a probability of a 
more or less tempting choice, there is a certainty that two simple temptations will be 
faced: at both  1 1 n =  and   2 1 n ≥  the agent has to decide whether to accept or reject a 
simple temptation with  0, 0 S P > < .  
Our goal is to investigate the sensitivity of the decisions to the timing. Suppose 
first that  2 1 n >  so there is at least some brief delay between the two decisions. Because 
of  the  recursive  nature  of  the  formulation  and  the  additivity  of  the  utilities,  the  two 
decisions are identical. If the option is not taken, utility is 0 and the self-control cost is 
( ) g S . If the option is taken, utility is P  and there is no self-control cost, so it is optimal 
to take at both  1 n  and  2 n  if  ( ) P g S − < , and not to take if  ( ) P g s − > . Notice that  the 
solution is the same for any value of  2 1 n n > ,and for any period length, so it holds in 




However, the solution changes if  2 1 n n = . In this case the possible actions are 
not to take,  0 a = , to take exactly one of the options,  1 a = , or to take both options 
2 a = . The temptation is to take both options, so utility is  ( ) (2 ) V a aP g S aS = − − . 
Then  (2) (1) 2 ( ) ( ) V V P P g S P g S − = − + = +   and  
(1) (0) ( ) (2 ) V V P g S g S − = − + .  When  g  is strictly convex  (2 ) ( ) ( ) g S g S g S − > . If 
(2 ) ( ) ( ) g S g S P g S − > − >  it is optimal to resist each temptation when the options are 
sequential but it is not optimal to resist both when they are presented simultaneously. 
This shows that this model of non-linear costs is not suited for analyzing decisions that 
occur in rapid succession.  Intuitively, the problem is that the non-linearity of control 
costs should “spill over” from one period to the next when time periods are short.  The 
next section extends the model to allow this. 
5. Willpower as a Stock and Increasing Marginal Cost of Self Control 
The reason that control costs are often convex is that self control can require the 
use of costly cognitive resources, as argued by Baumeister and various collaborators (for 
example Baumeister et al [1998] and Muraven et al [1998]). This implies that soon after 
one  tempting  choice  the  marginal  cost  of  another  tempting  choice  will  be  high;  for 
example two consecutive decisions a microsecond apart should be about the same as two 
simultaneous decisions. Thus, to develop a model that is consistent with convex control 
costs and also robust to the timing of decisions and the granularity of the periods, we 
need to incorporate the way the willpower stock induces a spillover from one period’s 
self control to self control in the near future. 
13 To do this, we develop a generalization of 
the willpower model of Ozdenoren et al [2009].     
Specifically, we assume that at the beginning of period n  there is a stock  n w  of 
cognitive  resources  or  willpower  available.  Note  that  this  is  part  of  the  vector  y . 
Foregone value ∆ has the same definition as before, and in particular is not affected by 
n w ; the change in the model is that the cost of self control comes from the fact that it 
                                                 
13 In the longer term, it is possible that willpower can be built up, that is, that the “willpower technology” 
can be improved. This introduces a range of issues that our model does not handle well, and we abstract 
away from it for most of the paper, section 6 explains some of the complications that arise when willpower 




depletes the stock of cognitive resources.  Specifically, when  ( , ) n n y a ∆  is the foregone 
value,  the  end  of  period  stock  is  ( , ( , )) n n n n w f w y a = ∆ ￿ ,  where  ( , ) n f w ∆   is  non-
decreasing in  n w  and non-increasing in ∆, continuously differentiable in both arguments 
and  satisfies  ( ,0) n n f w w =   and  ( , ) n n f w w ∆ ≤ .  Note  that  the  stock  of  cognitive 
resources depends on the action taken only through the foregone value, so actions that 
maximize the short-run self’s value also maximize the end-of-period stock  n w ￿ . 
In  Ozdenoren  et  al  the  stock  is  depleted,  but  never  replenished.  This  is  a 
reasonable approximation for the short-duration problem they analyze, but to adapt the 
model  to  longer  horizons  we  add  the  possibility  that  willpower  can  be  replenished. 
Specifically we set  1 ( ) n n n w r w w + = ≥ ￿ ￿ , where  r  is non-decreasing in  n w ￿ ; thus for a 
given  n w  the highest that  1 n w +  can be is  ( ) n r w , and this maximum is attained by actions 
that set  0 ∆ = . We assume also that  ( ) n r w w ≤ ￿  so that there is an upper bound on the 
stock of cognitive resources. If  ( ) n r w w = ￿  then resources are replenished immediately, 
which is the usual assumption when short-run selves live a single period. If  ( ) n n r w w = ￿ ￿  
resources are never replenished, as in Ozdenoren et al. Self-control costs arise because 
cognitive resources have alternative uses. Following Ozdenoren et al, we assume that an 
(end  of  period)  stock  of  cognitive  resources  n w ￿   yields  a  utility  in  other  uses  of 
( , ) n n m y w ￿ ,  non-decreasing  in  n w ￿ ,  and  that  this  is  added  to  the  utility  from 
consumption.
14 Ozdenoren et al view  n w ￿  as representing only the stock of willpower, and 
motivate its assumed value as arising from self-control problems that are not directly 
modeled. In our earlier work we provide evidence that cognitive resources matter, and 
that these resources have alternative uses, so we take a broader view of what the uses of 
these resources might be. 
  The objective function of the long-run self is then to maximize  
  ( ) , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , ( , ) )
n n h n n n n n V h E u y a m y f w a δ δ
∞
+ + + + + = ≡ − + ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Note that the contribution to utility of the stock of cognitive resources  ' n n w +  is measured 
in the same units as utility. Thus if there is a fixed stock w  of cognitive resources, the 
                                                 
14 It does not, however, enter into the computation of the temptation utility or the foregone value, as these 
are a cause of self-control cost, not a consequence. Note also that we do not impose the restriction  0 n w ≥ ￿  




stock produces an amount  ( , ) m y w  of utility each period. This  ( , ) m y w  is assumed to be 
concave, differentiable and strictly increasing in w . Recall that with full replenishment 
the cost was not normalized by 1 δ −  as the benefit is here. We will discuss the reason 
for this difference below. 
As in the linear case we assume LR0 which we repeat here for completeness: 
Assumption LR0:  ( , ) n V h a  has a maximum for each  , n n h . 
Note also that, as in the linear case, this is a Markov decision problem, so it has a Markov 
solution that depends only the state  n y .  
  We will say that the value of cognitive resources is state-independent if it depends 
on the state only through the stock of willpower; in a slight abuse of notation we use the 
same letter write this as:  ( , ) ( ) n n n m y w m w = ￿ ￿ . State-independent resource valuation has 
an important implication: it implies that the action most favored by the short-run self 
maximizes the utility of cognitive resources. To see this, define 
  , 0 ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
n
k
n h n M h E m w δµ δµ
∞
+ = ≡ − ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ , 
 and note that the value on the RHS is independent of k . If each period’s action is chosen 
to maximize the value  ( , ) k
n U h a  of the current short-run self, the foregone value each 
period is 0. This implies that the level of resources at each period is as high as possible 
given the initial value; with state-independent resource valuation, any action plan  a  that 
leads to this highest possible path for w ￿  also maximizes the flow of benefits  ( ) n m w ￿  in 
the strong sense that no other action plan leads to a higher value of m in any period along 
any history.  As a consequence, any action plan that maximizes short-run utility in each 
period on each history also maximizes the short-run self’s expected discounted value M  
of cognitive resources. We will use this latter implication in relating the model to a game 
between the long run self and the short run self, so we state it as a theorem: 
Theorem 4: With state-independent resource valuation, 




Relation to the Literature 
To  relate  the  model  with  willpower  to  past  work,  consider  the  “cake-eating” 
problem of Ozdenoren et al [2009].
15 Here there is a cake of fixed size, and the only 
choice is a consumption level  n a  that reduces the size of the cake. We suppose that 
0 µ =   and  that  ( , ) n n n r w a w = ￿ ￿ ,  so  that  there  is  no  replenishment.  Ozdenoren  et  al 
specify that the temptation is a fixed upper bound on consumption a  if the cake is not 
exhausted, and 0 if it is, and that the rate of willpower depletion is  ( , ) n n f a w ￿  for  n a a < , 
with  f decreasing and strictly convex in  n a . In addition  ( , ) 0 n n m y w = ￿  until the stock of 
cake runs out or the time horizon is reached, at which time  ( , ) ( ) n n n m y w m w = ￿ ￿ . In our 
formulation  ( , ) ( ) ( ) n n n y a u a u a ∆ = − , so if we set 
  ( , ( , )) ( ( ) ( , ), ) n n n n n n f w y a f u a y a w ∆ = − ∆ ￿ , 
we see that their model a special case of ours.
16 However, their formulation requires that 
cognitive  resource  utility  is  state-dependent.  This  possibility  leads  to  complications, 
because it implies that the plan most preferred by the short-run self, which is the plan that 
has the least temptation, need not minimize the resource cost of self-control. We examine 
this assumption in section 6, along with the possibility that actions have a direct impact 
on the evolution of cognitive resources; with either of these changes Theorem 4 can fail. 
For the time being we will assume state-independent cognitive resource utility.   
Next,  suppose  that  (i)  there  is  state-independent  resource  valuation,  that  (ii) 
( ) n r w w = ￿ , so that replenishment is immediate, and (iii) that  0 µ =  so that short-run 
selves  live  only  one  period.  Here  the  temptation  value  is  max ( , ) a n u y a ,  so 
( , ) max ( , ) ( , ) n n a n n n y a u y a u y a ∆ = − , and the benefit derived from cognitive resources 
in  period  n   is  ( ( , ( , ))) n m f w y a ∆ .  We  can  then  define 
( ) ( ) ( ( , )) ( ( , )) 0 c m w m f w m f w ∆ = − ∆ = − ∆ ≥ , and when  0 ∆ =  we have  ( ) 0 c ∆ = . 
Then the objective function is equal to   
  ( ) , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( ) ( ( , )) )
n n h n n n n V h E u y a m w c y a δ δ
∞
+ + + + = ≡ − + − ∆ ∑ a a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
                                                 
15 That model is in continuous time, here we give the discrete-time version. 
16  The function  f  here is not constrained to simply be the difference between  n w −∆ , which allows for 




which is equivalent to the one-period of life formulation used in Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006, 2010]. Note here that neither the function  f  nor the function  m  matters on its 
own: what matters is the composition m f ￿ , for this is what determines the cost function 
c .
17 
Single Decision Problems 
Cognitive resources serve to link the decisions in one period to control costs and 
thus subsequent decisions. Several of the examples we have considered  so far involve a 
single decision; in those cases the resource variable is superfluous.  To make this precise, 
we define what we mean by a single decision. Let  * Y  be the set of states in which a 
decision is possible, that is  * y Y ∉  implies # ( ) 1 A y ≤ . Then the probability of hitting 
* Y  from a state  * y Y ∈  must be zero: once a decision is offered, no further decisions 
are  possible.  Notice,  though,  that  if  y   can  occur  in  different  periods,  the  amount  of 
cognitive  resources  available  for  decision  making  may  be  different.  Suppose  that 
1 w w = , so that initially cognitive resources are “topped up”. In this case we say that 
resources start full.
18  
For any period  n  define the end of period resource stocks corresponding to an 
initial  shock  of  ∆  and  no  subsequent  shock  by  ( ) ( , ) n
n w f w ∆ = ∆ ￿ , 
1( ) ( ( , )) n
n w r f w + ∆ = ∆ ￿ , and for  1 ≥ ￿ 1( ) ( ( ( )),0) n n
n n w f r w + + + ∆ = ∆ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Then the cost of 
self-control corresponding to a single shock is  
  [ ]
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) n
n n g m w m w δ
∞
+ = ∆ = − ∑
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The following result is immediate 
Theorem  5:  If  there  is  a  single  decision  and  cognitive  resources  start  full,    the 
maximization problems 
                                                 
17 To model the effect of cognitive load (e.g. using short-term memory) on self control, Fudenberg and 
Levine [2006] assume that the control cost depends on the sum of the foregone value and cognitive load; 
this  corresponds  to  assuming  that  the  benefit  derived  from  cognitive  resources  in  period  n   is 
( ( , ( , ) )) n n m f w y a d ∆ + , where  n d  is the cognitive load in period n . 
18 The theorem also holds if there is a fixed time at which the decision is possible. That is if  * n y Y ∈  
implies  * n n =   then we may replace  w  with the fixed amount of cognitive resources  * w  available 




  ( ) , 0 (1 ) ( , ) ( , ( , ) )
n h n n n n n E u y a m y f w a δ δ
∞
+ + + + + = − + ∑ a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
  ( ) , 0 (1 ) ( , ) ( ( , ) )
n h n n n n E u y a g y a δ δ
∞
+ + + + = − − ∆ ∑ a
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
have the same set of solutions.. 
The Linear Case 
  Next suppose that in addition to conditions (i)-(iii) above, the benefit of cognitive 
resources is linear in  ∆, so that  ( , ) n n n m y w w γ = ￿ ￿ , and that resource depletion is linear 
as  well,  so  that  ( , ) f w w ∆ = −∆.
19  Then  the  cost  function  defined  above 
is ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) c w w δ γ δ γ γ δ ∆ = − − − − ∆ = − ∆,  so  the  linear  model  of  the 
previous  section,  where  the  cost  of  self-control  is  independent  of  δ,  corresponds  to 
scaling the cost by 1/(1 ) δ − . Intuitively, full replenishment means that all of the cost of 
self control is borne in the current period, so if foregone utility reduces the flow benefits 
of cognitive resources by a proportionate amount, the cost of self control goes to zero 
with the period length.  Conversely, if the cost of self-control is invariant to the period 
length and there is full replenishment, the flow cost in a period must become large as the 
periods get small. This is also true when there are convex costs: The convex cost model 
of Section 4 can be viewed as a model with full replenishment and linear depletion, 
where  the  benefits  at  w   are  independent  of  τ ,  while  for  smaller  stocks  we  have   
( ) ( ) ( )/(1 ) m w m w g τ δ −∆ = − ∆ − . As with the one-period of life model,  in the case of 
general  depletion  and  full  replenishment  we  can  define  the  cost  by 
( ) (1 )( ( ) ( ( , ))) g m w m f w τ δ ∆ = − − ∆ . 
  When benefits are linear as well we have a stronger result: the linear model with 
partial replenishment is equivalent to the linear model with full replenishment, so that  
partial replenishment has observable consequences only if at least one of   , f r  and m is 
non-linear.  Specifically,  we  say  the  model  has  linear  replenishment  of  resources  if 
( ) ( ) n n n r w w w w λ = + − ￿ ￿ ￿  where 0 1 λ ≤ ≤ . 
                                                 
19 Note that we define linear depletion to mean that foregone utility is subtracted one-for-one from the stock 
of resources.  In principle depletion might be linear with a coefficient other than 1, but we can normalize 















Then if  a  is a solution to the linear model with parameter Γ then it is a solution to the 
( , ) λ γ  model in which actions are independent of  n w  and all such solutions to the ( , ) λ γ  
model are solutions to the Γ model.   
Proof: See appendix. 
Theorem 6 shows that if depletion, replenishment, and self-control cost are all 
linear,  and  state  independent,  the  stock  of  self  control  is  irrelevant.  Note  that  it  is 
important for this result that resources are unbounded below; if there is a lower boundary 
the model is not linear there and the equivalence with full replenishment linear model 
breaks  down.  Note  also  that  the  equivalent  linear  parameter  Γ  depends  on  the 
replenishment rate: when resources are replenished very quickly ( 1 λ = ), the cost of self 
control is of the order (1 ) δ −  of a single period’s utility, while when replenishment is 
slow, self control has a long-term cost of order 1.    
Because Theorem 6 maps many ( , ) λ γ  models to the same linear model Γ, it also 
implies that these models are equivalent in the sense of generating the same decisions. 
That is, if we change λ to  ' λ  while holding the time period (and thus  δ and  µ) fixed, 









  − −   =      − − 
,  
even though the time-path of the willpower stock in the two models will be different. 
Intuitively, with linear costs all that matters is the average present value of the costs, and 
not their timing, which is why the stock of willpower resources does not matter.  
What  happens  with  linear  replenishment  when  we  vary  τ ,  the  length  of  the 
period? We will want to hold fixed the amount of calendar time required for a given 




that self-control in  a  given period reduces the  stock of willpower  at the start of that 
period.  That  is,  we  suppose  that  when  n ∆   is  spent  in  some  period  n ,  the  state 
immediately jumps from  n w  to  n w ￿ , and is then replenished according to the continuous-
time differential equation  ( ) t t w w w κ = − ￿ . Thus when the period length is  τ  we have 
1 exp( )( ) n n n w w w w κτ + = − − − ￿ , so  ( ) 1 exp( ) λ τ κτ = − − . Note that when the period is 
long,  the  state  almost  completely  replenishes.  Note  also  that  as  0 τ →   we  have 
( ) 0 λ τ → ,  ( ) 1 δ τ → . 
Example  7:  Resisting  Temptation  with  Linear  Benefits,  Depletion  and 
Replenishment 
Now we reconsider the persistent, and delayed temptations of Example 1 in the 
model with linear benefit, linear depletion and linear replenishment. As we will see, when 
the marginal value of cognitive resources is constant, the optimum is either to take at 
once or to resist forever. This will help illustrate Theorem 5 and the continuous-time 
limit. It will also set the stage for our subsequent analysis of these temptations when the 
benefit function is concave, where it may be optimal to resist for a while, and then take 
once the marginal value of resources is sufficiently high. 
   We begin with the case of a persistent temptation, where temptation is present 
each period unless and until it is accepted. Note that if the agent always resists, the stock 
of resources evolves according to  ( ) ( ) n n n r w w w w λ = + − ￿ ￿ ￿  so  
 
( ) 1 ( ) ( )
(1 )( ) (1 )( (1 ) )
n n n n
n n
w w w r w w w w w
w w w w S
λ
λ λ δµ
+ − = − = − + −




Since  0 1 λ < < ,  the  solution  to  this  difference  equation 
1 (1 )(1 (1 ) )(1 ) /
n
t w w S λ λ δµ λ
− = − − − − − ,  which  converges  monotonically  to  the 
steady state solution  ( ) * ( 1 ) (1 ) w w S λ λ δµ = − − / − , so that 
 
* (1 ) (1/ )(1 ) t w w S w S δµ λ δµ → − − = − − ￿  .   
Note that as the time period goes to 0, the steady state converges to  (( )/ ) w S ρ η κ − +  In 
particular, as  0 κ →  a steady drain of resources sends the stock to minus infinity, while 
as  κ → ∞  resources  replenish  so  quickly  that  any  bounded  outflow  has  negligible 




  If the benefits are linear, so that  ( ) m w w γ = , then by Theorem 6 the solution is 
the  same  as  in  the  linear  case:  The  agent  will  resist  the  temptation  if 
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Note  that  if  λ  is  small,  this  is  about  (1 ) (1 ) P S δ γ δµ − <− − ,  while  if  1 λ =   it  is   
(1 ) P S γ δµ <− − . Recall that P  is negative so as λ gets bigger this is easier to satisfy 
as we would expect. 
To  study  what  happens  when  the  time  period  is  short,  we  rewrite  
( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) P S δ λ γ δµ − − < − −  as 
  1 exp( )(exp( ))) (1 exp( ( ) )S ρτ κτ γ ρ η τ − − − < − − − + ,  
and then approximate, yielding  
  ( ) P S
ρ





Here the LHS is approximately the gain of postponing P  by  τ , and the RHS is the cost 
of  postponement;  this  is  the  reduction  of  resources  of  ( )S ρ η +   multiplied  by  the 
continous-time limit of the discrete-time cost parameter Γ.  
  As a check and explanation of Theorem 6, note that we get the same answer 
working directly with the partial replenishment system in continuous time: If the agent 
takes at once, the value is  P w γ + . If the agents resists forever, then in the associated 
continuous-time limit the state follows the path 
  ( ) / exp( )(( ) / ) t w w S t S ρ η κ κ ρ η κ = − + + − + . 
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∞
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− + ( + = − + ( +
∫
∫  
So again we see that it is optimal to resist if  ( )/ )) P S ρ γρ ρ η ρ κ < − + ( + .  
Note that when κ is very large compared to the other parameters, the right hand 
side is near 0 so it is always better to resist: if resources get quickly replenished whenever 
they dip slightly below the steady state. 
To extend this analysis to the case where declining the temptation delays it for a 
real time s , recall that when declining puts off the temptation for ￿ periods, it is optimal 
to  resist  if  (1 ( ) )/(1 ) P S δµ δ < −Γ − −
￿ ￿ ,  and  substituting  for  Γ  yields 
(1 (1 ))/(1 ) (1 ( ) )/(1 ) P S δ λ δ γ δµ δ − − − < − − −
￿ ￿ .  If we suppose that the delay is s  
units of real time,  / s τ = ￿ , and send τ  to zero while holding s fixed, then it is optimal 
to resist if   [ ] ( )/ (1 exp( ( ) )/(1 exp( ) P s s S ρ κ ρ γ ρ η ρ + < − − − + − − . 
In  the  case  s τ = ,  in  which  the  delay  is  only  a  single  period,  this  inequality 
reduces to  [ ] ( )/( ) P S ρ γρ ρ η ρ κ <− + +  which is what we had before. As s → ∞, the 
condition reduces to  /( ) P S γρ ρ κ < − +  which is easier to satisfy. More generally, as in 
the  discrete-time  model  the  decision  of  whether  to  take  at  once  or  resist  forever  is 
monotone in s : There is some s  (possibly 0 or infinity) such that the optimum is to take 
at once if s s <  and resist forever if s s > . When we re-examine this problem with a 
concave benefit function, we will see that it can be optimal to resist for a finite length of 
time and then take, and that the optimal time to give in is monotone in the length s  of the 
delay. 
  For ease of reference we summarize these findings with a proposition: 
Proposition 7:  With linear benefit, depletion and replenishment 
a)  When  the  agent  is  faced  with  a  persistent  temptation,  and 
( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) P S δ λ γ δµ − − > − − , he takes it at once; he resists the temptation forever 
when ( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) P S δ λ γ δµ − − < − − .  Thus the agent will resist for a while and then 
take  only  in  the  knife-edge  case  when  he  is  indifferent  between  taking  at  once  and 




(b)  In  the  limit  of  time  periods  going  to  zero,  the  agent  takes  at  once  if 
( )/ )) P S γ ρ η ρ κ > − + ( + and resists forever if   ( )/ )) P S γ ρ η ρ κ < − + ( + . Thus as 
κ → ∞  the  agent  resists  forever,    and  as  0 κ →   the  agent  takes  at  once  if 
( ) P S ρ γ ρ η > − + . 
(c) If declining the temptation puts it off for s  units of calendar time, the agent takes at 
once  or  resists  forever  as  P   is  greater  or  less  than 
[ ] (1 exp( ( ) )/(1 exp( ) /( ) s s S ρ η ρ γρ ρ κ − − − + − − + . 
 
The Replenishment Rate in Models with Linear Benefit and Cost 
If the system can be represented as linear replenishment for some κ, along with 
linear depletion and linear benefits, then as we saw in Theorem 5 the system is equivalent 
to the full replenishment model. Taking the limit as  0 τ →  we find that the equivalent 
marginal cost is  
 
(1 exp( ))
1 exp( ( ) ))
ρτ γ ργ
ρ κ τ ρ κ
− −
Γ = →
− − + +
 
In this limit, if  κ is very small so that any reduction in the stock is almost permanent, 
then  γ Γ → .  At the other extreme, when κ is very large, the equivalent cost Γ is near  
0. Intuitively, in this case reductions in resources are replaced so quickly that they are 
virtually costless, even though the amount of replenishment in a given period goes to 0 
with τ .  
To construct a limit that where the replenishment rate per period does not go to 
zero, take  1/ κ τ = , so that  ( ) 1 exp( 1) λ τ = − −  for all  τ ; here the  equivalent full-












This is a different answer than the one we obtained earlier in the full replenishment case 
when we held Γ fixed, as there we did not scale the cost of cognitive resources by 1 δ − . 
Hence  we  get  different  limiting  results  depending  on  whether  we  consider  a  limit  in 




considered earlier, where Γ is constant, corresponds to scaling  γ  along with κ; to hold 
Γ constant when  1/ κ τ = , we need to set  
 









so  that  self  control  remains  costly  in  the  limit,  even  though  the  stock  of  willpower 
replenishes very quickly. Note that in the limiting model of full replenishment the stock 
of willpower is irrelevant, so the model is essentially “state-free.”  However, the limiting 
argument shows that rapid replenishment with a very high flow value of benefits behaves 
in a way very similar to that state-free model. 
In the linear model the stock of willpower does not play a significant role: as we 
observed all replenishment rates are equivalent for appropriately chosen values of γ  and 
are equivalent to full replenishment for an appropriate value of  Γ. When there are non-
linearities  in  , f r   and/or  m ,  the  stock  of  willpower  determines  the  way  the  cost  of 
foregone utility is allocated between different periods,  so the rate of replenishment plays 
a more essential role. This is the case we study next. 
6. Cognitive Resources, Non-linearities, and Replenishment  
The main reason for introducing the cognitive resources variable is to allow for 
the possibility that (1) the cost of self-control depends on the stock, (2) the stock does not 
completely  replenish  from  one  period  to  the  next,  so  that  exerting  willpower  in  one 
period can have a carry-over effect on decisions made soon afterwards, and (3) the agent 
faces more than one decision so using self control in an earlier decision can alter the 
control cost in a subsequent one. The simplest way to capture this is to suppose that there 
is  no  replenishment  at  all,  so  that  the  stock  evolves  according  to 
1 ( , ( , )) n n n n w f w y a + = ∆ .  This stark assumption is sufficient for demonstrating many of 
the implications of willpower as a resource that is limited in the short run, but it is not 
necessary,  and  many  of  the  same  results  obtain  provided  that  replenishment  is 
incomplete.   
In general, the dynamic value of cognitive resources given the foregone utility 




equation  1 ( ) n n w r w + = ￿  and of course the benefit function  ( , ) n n m y w ￿ . Putting together 
the  depletion  and  replenishment  equations  gives  the  dynamics  of  cognitive  resources 
1 ( ( , )) n n n w r f w + = ∆ ,  where  ( ) n n w r w w ≥ ≥ ￿ ￿   is  non-decreasing  and 
( , ) , ( ,0) n n n n n f w w f w w ∆ ≤ =  is non-decreasing in  n w  and non-increasing in  n ∆ . 
Linear Replenishment 
The units in which  n w  are measured are essentially arbitrary; by changing them 
we change  , f r  and  m .  As we shall see there is redundancy in these three functions, 
meaning that we can choose one of them to normalize.    
Specifically,  let  0 1 λ < <   be  a  fixed  number.  We  would  like  to  construct  a 
change  of  units  1 ' ( ) w h w − =   so  that  the  property  ( ( ')) ( ( ')) h w w w r h w λ − − =   is 
satisfied, so that the replenishment function  ' r  corresponding to  ' w  has the linear form 
' '
1 '( ) n n w r w + = ￿ . Given such a function we may define  1 '( ', ) ( ( ( '), )) f w h f h w − ∆ = ∆ , 
1 '( ') ( ( ( ')) m w h m h w − = , and in the new units with the new depletion and benefit of self 
control functions, we have restated the problem so that replenishment is linear. 
There are a variety of ways of constructing an h  function. One simple method is 
to consider intervals  (0, ] I w λ λ =  under the mapping  ( ') ( ') T w w w w λ ≡ − − . Notice 
that the intervals of the iterated map  ( ) n T Iλ  (since T  is invertible, we allow negative 
values of n ) form a partition of ( , ) w −∞ . Hence for any  ' w w <  there exists a unique 
integer  ( ') n w  (possibly negative) such that  ( ') ' ( ) n w w T Iλ ∈ . The interval Iλ  for the units 
' w  corresponds to (0, (0)] r  in the original units  ' w . Define   
 
( ')
( ') ( ')
( ') (0)
n w
n w T w
h w r r
w λ
−     =       
. 
If  (0) 0 r >  and r  is strictly increasing for w w < ￿ , (0, (0)] r  is a non-empty interval, so t 
h   maps  onto  ( , ) w −∞ .  In  this  case  h   is  strictly  increasing,  so  invertible,  and  by 
construction  ( ( ')) ( ( ')) h w w w r h w λ − − = .  If  r   is  continuous,  h   is  continuous  and 
(0) 0 h = ;  h   extends  uniquely  to  a  continuous  function  on  ( , ] w −∞   by  defining 
( ) h w w = . 




Theorem 8: Suppose that r  is continuous and strictly increasing and that  (0) 0 r > . The 
system  with  replenishment  '( ') (1 )( ') r w w w w λ = − − − ,  depletion 
1 '( ', ) ( ( ( '), )) f w h f h w − ∆ = ∆ ,  and  benefit  function  1 '( ') ( ( ( ')) m w h m h w − =   maps 
strategies  to  values  of  the  agent’s  objective  function  exactly  as  does  the  system  with 
replenishment function  ( ) r w , depletion function  ( , ) f w ∆  and benefit function  ( ) m w . 
  Notice that the rescaling of units to linearize  r  is possible only when there is 
some  replenishment  (0) 0 r >   and  less  than  full  replenishment  r   strictly  increasing. 
When there is full replenishment, we cannot change the units to spread the foregone 
utility shock over time: only in the linear case does Theorem 5 hold – as soon as there is 
non-linearity partial replenishment spreads the marginal cost of self-control over time.   
Note also that if we start with a system where benefits and depletion are linear, and 
replenishment is linear with some  ' λ , then the equivalent system in units of  ' w  for a 
different  value  of  λ  is  not  linear.  This  may  seem  puzzling  in  light  of  our  earlier 
observation that Theorem 5 implies an equivalence between linear models with different 
replenishment rates. However, the equivalence in Theorem 5 is only for average present 
values, not the stronger sort of equivalence established here, which tracks the moment-
by-moment movement of the flow benefit of cognitive resources. The weaker form of 
equivalence is sufficient when benefits and depletion are linear, but once these functions 
are  allowed  to  be  non-linear  the  stronger  sort  of  equivalence  is  needed,  and  this 
equivalence requires a non-linear change of units. 
Non Linear Costs and Linear Replenishment 
Now we investigate the implications of non-linear costs when the agent faces 
multiple decisions, so that self control in one period can increase the marginal cost of self 
control in the next one.   To make the computations easier we pick units so there is linear 
replenishment,  ( ) ( ) n n n r w w w w λ = + − ￿ ￿ ￿ , In the examples that follow we will frequently 
need to compute the average present value of cognitive resources when the stock at the 
start of period n  is some arbitrary  n w  and no self control is used from period n . With 
linear replenishment and no foregone utility,  (1 ) n n w w w λ λ + = − + ￿ ￿
￿ . Along this path 




   
0 ( ) (1 ) ( ) n n M w m w δ δ
∞
+ = = − ∑
￿
￿ ￿ .  
To  study  the  effect  of  varying  the  period  length  recall  that  we  take 
( ) 1 exp( ) λ τ κτ = − − , so for small τ  we have  ( ) λ τ κτ ≈ .  
Example 8: Two Tempting Choices with Linear Depletion and Replenishment 
Now  we  re-analyze  the  two  temptations  of  example  6  assuming  partial  linear 
replenishment and linear depletion., We show that the agent makes the same decision 
whether the decisions on the two temptations are made simultaneously or in very rapid 
succession, because the time path of cognitive resources is basically the same, whether 
the  agent  resists  temptation  of  value  two  S   in  a  single  period  or  resists  S   in  two 
consecutive periods that are close together . 
Suppose first that the decisions are made in consecutive periods, so that  1 1 n = , 
2 2 n = . The agent has four possible plans: 
 
Take both options: The first option is provides direct utility of  P , the second option 
provides  P δ , and no self control is used, so overall utility is  1 (1 ) ( ) P M w δ + +  
. 
Take only second option:  Self control of S is used in the first period,  and none thereafter, 
so  1 1 w w S = − ￿ ,  2 1 (1 ) w w S w λ λ λ = − + − , and the overall value is  
1 2 0 (1 ) ( ) ( ) m w S P M w δ δ δ + − − + + . 
 
Take only the first option: No self control is used in the first period; in the second period 
the foregone SR utility (and thus the expenditure of cognitive resources) is S  and no self 
control is used thereafter, so cognitive  resources at the  end of the second period  are 
1 (1 ) w w S λ λ + − − ,  so  the  stock  at  the  start  of  the  third  period  is 
( )
2 2
3 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) w w w w S w w S λ λ λ λ λ λ λ ≡ − + + − − = + − − .  The  value  of  this 
plan is thus 
2





Reject  both  options:  Self-control  is  used  in  both  periods, 
2 2
3 1 (1 ) (1 ) w w w S λ λ λ λ = + − − +   so  the  value  is 
2
1 1 3 ( ) (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( ) m w S m w S w S M w δ δ λ λ λ δ − + − − + − − + . 
 
Because  the  two  projects  are  identical,  when  the  decisions  are  made 
simultaneously there are only three plans to consider:  
 
Take both options: Here the overall value is  1 2 ( ) P M w + . 
Take  one  option:  Here  2 1 w w S w λ λ λ = − + ,  and  overall  value  is 
1 2 (1 ) ( ) ( ) P m w S M w δ δ + − − + . 
Reject  both  options:  Now  2 1 2 w w S w λ λ λ = − +   and  the  overall  value  is 
1 2 (1 ) ( 2 ) ( ) m w S M w δ δ − − + . 
 
 
We now send  τ  to 0, and examine the case where two decisions are made in 
consecutive periods. In the full-replenishment model of the previous section, resisting 
temptation of S  in two consecutive periods reduces the flow of cognitive benefits each 
period  from  ( ) m w   to  ( ) m w S − ,  which  reduces  average  value  (compared  to  no  self 
control) by  (1 )( ( ) ( )) m w m w S δ − − − , while resisting  2S  in a single period reduces 
average value by  (1 )( ( ) ( 2 )) m w m w S δ − − − , which is strictly larger, even as  0 τ → ,  
because m  is concave.  
In the present problem with linear replenishment, we see that the time path of 
cognitive resources is basically the same, whether the agent resists temptation of two S  
in a single period or resists S  in two consecutive periods that are close together: In the 
first case resources jump down to  2 w S −  at the end of the first period, in the second 
case we have  1 ; w w S = − ￿   2 1 1 (1 ) (1 )( ) w w w w S w λ λ κτ κτ = + − ≈ − − + ￿ , and   
  2 1 1 1 (1 )( ) 2 ( ) w w S w S w S w w S κτ κτ κτ = − − + − = − + − + ￿ . 
Hence as  0 τ → ,  2 1 2 w w S → − ￿ , which is the level of  1 w ￿ in the case of a simultaneous 




options with simultaneous decisions, she will have the same preference when the decision 
times are close together. If the agent strictly prefers to take one option with simultaneous 
decisions, she will prefer to take the first one when decisions are sequential 
Example  9:  A  Persistent  Temptation  with  Non-Linear  Benefits  and  No 
Replenishment 
To  further  explore  the  implications  of  willpower  being  a  stock  that  can  be 
depleted over time, we now revisit the persistent temptation of examples 1 and 4 in a 
setting  with  no  replenishment  of  cognitive  resources,  linear  depletion,  and  non-linear 
benefits.  One of the main differences is that with it may now be optimal to resist a while 
and then take the temptation once the marginal benefit of resources becomes sufficiently 
high.  
Because there is no replenishment at all, the stock decreases by  (1 )S δµ ∆ = −  




1 (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) n n
n n m w n S m w S P δ δ δµ δ δµ δ
− ∞ − −
= =
  − − − + − − +     ∑ ∑
￿ ￿
￿ ￿  
The bigger is ￿ the smaller is the first term and the larger is the second. This implies that 
a necessary condition for an optimal ￿ is that the value for resisting  1 + ￿  time is not 
bigger, and that a sufficient condition for  0 = ￿  optimal is that the value for  1 = ￿  is 
lower. Let us look at the value for ￿ minus the value for  1 + ￿ , noting that prior to ￿ the 
arguments of m  are the same in both cases  
  [ ] ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( ( 1)(1 ) ) (1 ) D m w S m w S P δ δµ δµ δ = − − − − + − + − ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Observe that since m  is convex,  ( ) D ￿  is strictly increasing, so it is optimal to take at the 
first  time  this  expression  is  positive,  and  never  to  take  if  it  is  always  negative.  To 
characterize the solution for small  τ  define  / ( , ) ( / )/ (1 ) s d s D s τ τ τ δ δ = − . Note that 
this has the same sign as  D  so can equally well be used to characterize the optimum. 
Observe that 










We see that if  '( ) m −∞ = ∞ it is always optimal to give in; if  




+ <  
then  it  is  not  optimal  to  give  in  right  away,  and  that  the  optimal  time  to  give  in  is 
characterized by  ( ) 0 d s = .  
  This case of no replenishment is extreme, and we will soon revisit this example to 
allow not only partial linear replenishment but also a general depletion function. First, 
though, we want to make a simpler point about the possibility it is optimal to “wait to 
commit.” 
  The case where declining the temptation postpones the decision for a number of 
periods T  is also of interest.  Using an analogous argument to the one above, it can be 
shown that the stopping time is increasing in T ; we omit the details. 
Example 10: Waiting to Commit 
  Now we add to Example 9 the possibility of taking the temptation off the table for 
a cost  F P < . For simplicity we analyze only the no-replenishment case with linear 
depletion.  
Using the argument from Example 9, we see that for small enough  τ  it is not 
optimal to commit immediately if 




− − < . 
A sufficient condition is  




+ − < , or 









  Let us suppose that  








so that in the absence of the possibility of commitment, it is optimal never to give in, 
resulting in at least the value  ( ) m w P + .Taking the temptation off the table in the first 
period gives value 
 
1
0 1 lim (1 ) ( (1 )
( )
n
n m w S F F
m w F F
τ δ δ δµ
∞ −
→ =
  − − − − −    
= − −
∑  
Hence a sufficient condition for committing is  ( ) ( ) 0 m w m w F P F − − + + < . 
Observe that  
( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) m w m w F F P m w F F F P m w P F F P − − + + ≤ − + + ≤ + + +
. 
Thus a sufficient condition for committing is  




+ < − . 
This together with (*) from above are sufficient for it to be optimal to wait a while then 
commit. To see that both conditions can be satisfied simultaneously, take  /2 F P = . 
Then the sufficient condition for committing is  '( ) 1 m w P + <  while (*) becomes 











In other words, if the marginal benefit of cognitive resources is low when resources are 
higher than  w P + , and if  F  is small, but not too small, then it pays to use cognitive 
resources for self-control until the marginal benefit of cognitive resources is sufficiently, 
then commit to taking the temptation off the table. 
  Houser et al [2010] have a very suggestive experiment indicating that delay in 
commitment  may  occur  in  practice.  This  experiment  was  designed  to  test  previous 
models with myopic short run selves, and the experimental instructions did not specify 
when and whether opportunities for giving in might occur in the future. Thus it is not 
clear what subjects believed about this, and whether the perfect foresight analysis applies. 
That is, while delay was observed, we can not be certain from these experiments whether 




may  shed  more  light  on  the  type  of  delay  that  can  occur  with  cognitive  resource 
depletion, but not without it. 
 
Example  11:  A  Persistent  Temptation  with  Non-Linear  Benefits,  Partial  Linear 
Replenishment and General Depletion. 
We  now  examine  a  final  variation  on  the  persistent  temptation  problem.  We  
consider a persistent temptation without the option to commit, and now assume partial 
linear replenishment,  and allow general depletion. This lets us highlight the interplay of 
the benefit function m  and the depletion function f .   
To begin, note that regardless of the form of the benefit and depletion functions,  
if there is full replenishment the problem is stationary, so it is never optimal to wait for a 
while  and  then  take.  Defining  the  cost  of  self-control  as  in  Section  4,  by 
( ) (1 )( ( ) ( ( , ))) g m w m f w τ δ ∆ = − − ∆   we  see  that  the  policy  of  taking  at  once  gives 
payoff  ( ) P m w + , and resisting forever  gives payoff  ( ( ,(1 ) )) m f w S δµ − , so resisting 
forever is optimal if  ( ( ,(1 ) )) ( ) ((1 ) ))/(1 ) P m f w S m w g S δµ δµ δ < − − = − − − .  
 Now let us generalize the linear case with partial replenishment to allow for a 
lower bound on the stock of cognitive resources. That is, in place of linear m  we have 
( ) m w w γ =  for  0 w ≥  and  ( ) m w = −∞ for  0 w <  (which is our way of modeling a 
lower bound of 0 on resources). If  (1 ) P S γ δµ <− −  then as in our earlier analysis the 
optimum is to take the temptation immediately. If  ( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) P S δ λ γ δµ − − > − −  the 
solution  is  to  resist  forever  if  it  is  feasible  to  do  so: 
( )
* (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 ) 0 w S w S δµ λ δµ − − = − / − − ≥ 1 (1 ) / S w δµ λ − − > .  Otherwise,  if 
( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) P S δ λ γ δµ − − > − −  and 1 (1 ) / S w δµ λ − − <  the solution is to resist until 
one more period of resistance would “exhaust the stock” (that is make  0 w < ￿ ) and then 
give in to the temptation.  
Now let us consider the general case, normalizing to have linear replenishment.  
We assume that m  and f  are twice continuously differentiable, and that  
 
((1 ) ) ( ,0)
dm f








(which is positive) is decreasing in  w ;  we call this “increasing marginal cost of self 
control.”  Note  that  there  is  increasing  marginal  cost  of  self-control  if  m   is  strictly 
concave and  f  is linear. We may also write this condition in terms of second derivatives 
as 
    
2 2
2 ((1 ) ) ( ,0) ((1 ) ) ( ,0) 0
d m f dm f
A w Aw w A w Aw w
dw w dw
∂ ∂
− − + − − + <
∂∆ ∂∆∂ ,  
If m  is concave, this says that the cross-partial of  f  should not be “too negative.”  If the 
cross partial is strongly positive, then m  need not be concave. 
Proposition 7: Suppose there is increasing marginal cost of self control and there is 
strictly partial linear replenishment,  0 κ < .   Then there is  0 τ >  such that if  τ τ < ,  
there  are  0 P P τ τ > >   such  that  it  is  optimal  to  resist  forever  if  P Pτ > ,  it  is 
optimal  to  resist  until  period  ˆ 1 ∞ > > ￿   then  take  if  P P P τ τ > > ,  and  it  is 
optimal to take immediately if  P P τ > .  Let  0 0 , P P  denote the limits as  0 τ → . Let  s W  
be the solution to the differential equation 
  ( ) ( ,0)( ) t t t
f
W w W W S κ ρ η
∂
= − + +
∂∆
￿ , 
and let W∞ be the solution to  0 ( ) ( ,0)( )
f
w W W S κ ρ η ∞ ∞
∂
= − + +
∂∆
.  Then 
  ( )
0
0
( ) '( ) ( ,0) t f











( ) '( ) ( ,0) t f




∂∆ ∫  
and  if  0 0 P P P > >   then  0 ˆ ˆ lim s τ τ → = ￿  is  finite  and  strictly  positive,  and  is 
determined by  
  ( )
ˆ ˆ
0
( ) '( ) ( ,0) t t
s s
f
P S e m w e W W dt ρ κ κ ρ η
∞ − + − ∂
= + −
∂∆ ∫ . 
 
Remark  1:  One  way  of  reading  this  result  is  that  the  agent’s  choice  depends  on  the 
magnitude  of  P,  but  recall  that  (1 ) T T




(1 ( ) ) ( ) T T
g b S u u δµ δµ = − − , so changing P  implies changes in S  and/ or in δ and µ 
(or ρ and η in the continuous-time formulation) and any of these other changes will also 
matter for the decision.  
 
Remark 2: To better understand the formulas given above, note that when depletion and 
benefits are both linear,  






t P P S e dt S ρ κ ρ η




= = + =
+ ∫   
which is the same as the condition for the critical value of P given in part (b) of Theorem 
6 for the linear case.  
 
Remark 3: To illustrate the fact that “concavity of the optimization” can come from any 
of the 3 functions  , f m and r , consider the case where f  and m   are linear, and r   is 
piecewise linear:  
1 ( ) ( ) n n n r w w w w λ = + − ￿ ￿ ￿  for  * [ , ] n w w w ∈ ￿  
2 ( ) ( ) n n n r w w w w λ = + − ￿ ￿ ￿ , for   *
n w w < ￿ ,   
where 1 1 1 exp( ), λ κ τ = − − 2 2 1 exp( ), λ κ τ = − − and 
  2 1 ( )/ ) ( )/ ) S P S γ ρ η ρ κ γ ρ η ρ κ − + ( + < < − + ( +  
Then if the replenishment rate was fixed at  1 κ  the agent would always resist, while if it 
was fixed at 2 κ  the agent would take the temptation at once. We claim that the short-time-
period  solution  with  the  piecewise  linear  replenishment  function  is  to  resist  until 
resources fall to 
* w . To see why, first consider the agent’s problem when the state is at 
* w . Resisting forever gives exactly the same payoff as when the replenishment rate is 
fixed at  2 κ , and taking gives a higher payoff than with replenishment fixed at  2 κ , so since 
taking gives a higher payoff here than with  2 κ κ =  the agent takes.  Next consider the 
agent’s  problem  when 
* w w > :  the  gain  from  resisting  for  a  short  interval  and  then 






The proof of Proposition 7 is in the appendix, but the intuition is simple. We first 
show that because of the increasing marginal cost of self control, and because resisting 
temptation lowers the stock next period, the gain to waiting one more period is monotone 
in  the number of periods  ￿ that the temptation has been resisted.  Thus, if  P  is small 
enough (sufficiently bad) relative to all the other parameters it is optimal to wait forever, 
if  P  is  close enough to 0  it is optimal to take at once, and for intermediate P it is 
optimal to wait a while and then take.  For an arbitrary length  τ  of the time period, this 
intermediate region may be empty, but when  τ  is very small the concavity assumption  
ensures that it is non-empty. 
 
 
7. The Game Between Long-run and Short-run Selves 
We now want to show that the optimization problem we have been considering 
can be identified with the outcome of a game between the long-run self and a sequence of 
short-run selves. To do this we introduce an augmented state variable  k Y  that is defined 
in any period  n  in which a new short-run self is born, and includes along with  n y  the 
value of n ; that is  ( , ) k n Y y n = . Notice that any strategy a  mapping histories to actions 
induces a well-defined stochastic kernel  1 ( , )[ ] k k Y dY + Π a .  
In the game formulation the “actions” are taken by the short-run selves, and the 
long-run self chooses “self-control” actions that influence the preferences of the short-run 
self. Each short-run self can be thought of as choosing an  a : Although this contains 
irrelevant information such as how the short-run self will behave after he “dies” we will 
ignore this in computing the short-run self’s payoff. Following Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006] we assume that before the short-run self moves, the long-run self chooses a self-
control action e ∈ Ξ. It is convenient to take  0 E = A ∪ .We wish to study a sequence 
of stage game between the long-run self and the k th short-run self. The k th stage game 
consists of a choice of self control action e  by the long-run self and a response a  by the 
short-run self. The utility of the  k th short-run self has the form  ( , , ) k u Y e a , which we 




Histories  in  this  game  are  sequences  of  augmented  states  k Y   along  with  the 
chosen  actions  , k k e a ,  while  a  strategy  from  the  long-run  self  is  a  map  e  from  the 
previous history to a self-control action, a strategy for the  k th short-run self is a map 
k a from the previous history and choice of the long-run self to an action. The vector of 
strategies for all short-run players is denoted  a
￿
. We define the conditional expectation 
operator  , , k Y Ee a  given the strategies  e,a  and state  k Y . The long-run self is completely 
benevolent and maximizes the discounted sum of short-run self utilities: 
 
1 1 , , 0 ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )
k
k k k Y k V Y E u Y e δ δ
∞
= ≡ − ∑ e a e a a ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
We now wish to specify the utility function of the short-run self to satisfy the 
assumptions of costly and unlimited self-control and limited indifference in Fudenberg 
and Levine [2006]. In that paper we give a procedure for deriving a utility function from 
an underlying objective function and a “cost of self control” function. We mimic that 
procedure here – the goal being to define the objective function for the short-run self so 
that the reduced form optimization problem is that of maximizing 
  ( )
1 , 0 (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) n
Y n n n n n E u a y m y w δ δ
∞
= − + ∑ a ￿ . 
To this end we first define  , , n
k
Y Ee a  to be the conditional expectation when  k  is alive. 
Write 
  0, , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
k
n k k S
k Y k n k n n U Y E u a y δ δµ
− ∞
+ + = ≡ − ∑ a a ￿  
and as above 
  0, , 0 ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
k
n k k
k Y k n k n n M Y E m y w δ δµ
− ∞
+ + = ≡ − ∑ a a ￿ ￿ , 
 
Following Fudenberg and Levine [2006] we define 
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which  has  the  property  that  ( , ) 0 k C Y ≥ a   and  ( , ) 0 k C Y = a   if  and  only  if 
' argmax ( , ') k U Y ∈ a a a ￿ .  
  Notice that the cost of self-control does not necessarily satisfy the property of 
being an opportunity cost. In general an opportunity cost for the short run self would have 
the form 
  ( , ) ( ( ) ( , )) k k k C Y G U Y U Y = − a a ￿ ￿ . 
Here the self-control cost is computed each period by the difference between the best 
expected present value available to a short-run self born in that period and the present 
value actually received, taking into account what will actually happen in future periods, 
in contrast to our definition of the recursive cost, which is “as if” no self-control will be 
used in future periods.  However, as this dependence is only through the variation of the 
marginal cost over time: In the linear case, where marginal cost is constant, the recursive 
cost is an opportunity cost.  
Theorem 10: If  ( , ) ( ( ) ( , )) k k k C Y U Y U Y = Γ − a a ￿ ￿  then  ( , ) ( , ) k k C Y C Y = a a ￿ . 
The proof is in the Appendix. They key idea is that the principle of optimality for the 
short-run  self  enables  us  to  write  the  overall  loss  to  the  short-run  self  as  a  sum  of 
recursively computed losses 
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Hence the opportunity cost is just a weighted sum of the increments  ( , ) n n y a + + ∆ ￿ ￿ , and 
the proof simply consists of bookkeeping to verify that the weights are the same as in the 
recursive case.   In the linear case, in other words, it does not matter whether the 
cost of imposing self-control on the short-run self arises from recursive considerations or 




leads to implausible predictions about timing, such as changes in behavior when a short-
run self “dies.” Hence we focus on the recursive model of self-control cost in the non-
linear case. 
As in Fudenberg and Levine [2006] we wish to consider equilibria in which the 
short-run selves optimize following every history and the long-run player anticipates this 
reaction and plays like a Stackelberg leader. This is designed to capture what we imagine 
is the strategic naivete of the short-run self: With one-period lifetimes for the short-run 
players,  this  Stackelberg  equilibrium  is  equivalent  to  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in 
which the long-run player moves first against each short-run player, and to the weaker 
concept of “SR-perfect Nash equilibrium” defined in Fudenberg and Levine [2006].  If 
we assume that the long-run player can choose a self-control action  k e  that is observed by 
short-run  self  k   before  choosing  plan  k a   SR-perfect  Nash  equilibrium  has  the  same 
implication  here.  However,  the  assumption  that  k e   is  chosen  once  and  for  all  at  the 
beginning of the life of short-run self k  is stronger when the short-run self lives multiple 
periods. First, the self-control action changes the preferences of the short-run self over 
many  periods.  Second,  the  self-control  action  cannot  be  “changed”  as  long  as  the 
particular  short-run  self  is  alive.  Again,  this  assumption  is  intended  to  capture  the 
strategic naivete of the short-run self. 
As  is  the  case  in  which  the  short-run  self  lives  only  for  a  single  period,  the 
expectations of the short-run self about play by the long-run self do not matter, because 
the long-run self has already moved. For this reason, the situation does not correspond to 
a  repeated  game  (which  it  would  in  the  absence  of  the  commitment  assumption.) 
Moreover, the case for subgame perfection may be stronger here than it is in general, as 
when  the  long-run  self  can  commit,  the  predictions  of  subgame  perfections  are  less 
sensitive to changes in the information structure.   
Fudenberg and Levine [2006] defines a SR-perfect Nash equilibrium profile to be 
equivalent to a solution to the reduced form optimization problem of maximizing 
  ( )
1 , 0 ( ,0, ) ( , ) k
Y k k k E uY C Y δ
∞
= − ∑ a a a  
if the reduced strategy induced from the short-run players strategy profile is a solution to 




profile with this property for a particular solution to the optimization problem, we say 
that  this  solution  of  the reduced  form  optimization  problem  is  equivalent  to  the  SR-
perfect  Nash  equilibrium  profile.  As  the  conditions  of  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2006] 
Theorem 1 are satisfied, this equivalence does indeed hold. 
  We now wish to relate solutions to the optimization problem equivalent to SR-
perfect Nash equilibria 
  ( )
1 , 0 ( ,0, ) ( , ) k
Y k k k E uY C Y δ
∞
= − ∑ a a a  
to those of  
  ( )
1 , 0 (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) n
Y n n n n n E u a y m y w δ δ
∞
= − + ∑ a ￿  
the agent’s objective function that we have used as the starting point in this paper. To this 
end,  observe  that  since  we  have  assumed  state  independent  resource  valuation,  by 
Theorem 4  ' ( , ) max ( , ') ( , ) k k k C Y M Y M Y = − a a a a ￿ ￿  holds for  ' argmax ( ,0, ) k u Y ∈ a a a , 
hence for all a . Hence 
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Thus the reduced form of the game is the same agent’s objective function that we used in 
our analysis, hence our study of the solutions of the agent’s objective function can be 
interpreted as an equilibrium of this game.   
  Notice that we have assumed that the long-run self can commit for the lifetime of 
the short-run self. This is intended to capture the strategic naivete of the short-run self as 
a passive actor. Notice that if the long-run self simply moves first each period but cannot 
commit to contingent plans for future periods, the equilibrium here is still a SR-perfect 




problem is Markov, so that the long-run self has no wish to renege on his commitment. 
However, without commitment there can be other equilibria in which the short-run self 
chooses a plan different from that suggested by the long-run self as part of a repeated 
game equilibrium. However, we regard such equilibria as inconsistent with our notion of 
nature of the short-run self. 
6. Actions That Increase Cognitive Resources   
So far, except when discussing the Ozdenoren et al model, we have assumed that 
cognitive  resources  depend  on  actions  only  through  the  foregone  utility  ∆,  and  that 
cognitive resources are maximized by setting  0 ∆ = . In particular, we have assumed that 
the replenishment rate  ( ) n r w ￿  does not depend directly on the action taken, and that the 
value  ( , ) n n m y w ￿  of cognitive resources is state independent, so actions do not indirectly 
change the effective level or value of cognitive resources.  Notice that Theorem 4 fails if 
the value of cognitive resources  m  depends either directly or indirectly on actions or 
elements of the state other than  t w . This is a key ingredient in the game between the 
long-run and short-run self: it means that there is no intrinsic conflict between the two 
over the use of cognitive resources, which is why the reduced form derived from the 
game is the same agent’s objective function we have examined in detail. In the examples 
of  this  section,  Theorem  4  fails,  which  raises  the  question  of  which  is  the  “correct” 
objective function: the agent’s objective function used above and in the examples, or the 
reduced form that is derived from the game between long-run and short-run self. Indeed it 
raises broader questions about what is the appropriate model. 
Observe that the issue of value of cognitive resources depending on the history 
also arises in the linear case. Here in addition to the failure of Theorem 5, Theorem 4 also 
fails:  it  is  no  longer  true  that  the  stock  of  self-control  serves  merely  to  allocate  the 
marginal utility of self-control between periods. 
The next example illustrates the complexities that can occur when actions can 
directly influence future marginal costs of self-control: current choices can have the same 
implications for future choice as a commitment to avoid temptation, but, unlike such a 




attainable payoff, so it has no foregone value and thus does not require a control cost to 
implement. 
 
Example 12: State-Dependent Marginal Cost 
We  assume  full  replenishment  of  willpower  each  period,  so  the  stock  of 
willpower is constant and thus irrelevant. As in the case of constant marginal cost, we 
assume both linear resource depletion and linear value of cognitive resources. However, 
we drop the assumption that the marginal benefit of cognitive resources are constant, and 
instead let them depend on the state.  Specifically, we assume  ( , ) ( ) n n n n m y w y w = Γ ￿ ￿  and 
more specifically that the marginal benefit  ( ) n y Γ  in period 1 is  0 Γ >  while from period 
2 it is either Γ or 0 depending on the first period choice. ( 
  In period 1 there is a choice of whether or not to pay a cost  F ; think of it as 
spending time learning self control, perhaps with the aid of a counselor or religious or 
spiritual advisor. If the cost is paid then there is no problem of self control at all in future 
periods, that is  ( ) 0 n y Γ = ; if the cost is not paid, the marginal benefit remains equal to 
Γ.  
In period 2 the agent can decide whether to take or resist a simple temptation, 
with  short-run  player  value  S   and  direct  value  P   for  the  long  run  player,  with 
0 S P > >   and  P S < −Γ ,  so  that  if  the  agent  does  not  pay  in  period  1, it  will  be 
optimal to take in period 2. 
Now we examine the decision in period 1. The future best value for the short run 
self is  S δµ , regardless of whether F  is paid today or not. Thus the temptation utility is 
S δµ , the utility the SR associates with “pay” is  (1 ) S F δµ δµ − − , so the foregone value  
of “pay” is  (1 ) F δµ −  and the self-control cost for this action is   (1 ) F δµ Γ − .  Hence it is 
optimal in the reduced form problem to “pay” whenever  (1 ) F P δµ δ Γ − < − .  
In contrast, if paying  F  today made taking tomorrow impossible, the foregone 
value of “pay” is  (1 ) S F δµ δµ + − , so for some parameters (such as  µ close to 1) the 
commitment will not be optimal even though the arguably equivalent “training” action 




consequence of our assumption that the short-run selves are strategically naïve, so that 
the short-run  player is unconcerned by any action that leaves the feasible set unchanged. 
Models with non-naïve short-run players may also be of interest, but they are much more 
complicated.
20 
To  make  this  example  simple,  we  kept  the  stock  of  willpower  constant  and 
assumed that the first-period action had a direct effect on the cost of self-control in the 
second period. Similar effects could be obtained if we allowed the replenishment function 
r  to depend on the action as well as on the end of period willpower, and let the benefits 
of  cognitive  resources  be  slightly  concave  (so  that  the  cost  is  slightly  convex). 
Specifically, suppose that acting in the first period increases the willpower stock from 1 
to 
* 1 w + , and that the benefit of cognitive resources w  is w
α  for some  (0,1) α ∈ . Then 
if the agent does not act in the first period, the cost of resisting second period temptation 
is  1 (1 ) S S
α α δµ αδµ − − ≥ , while the cost if the agent acts goes to 0 with 
* w .  
7. Conclusion 
The  random-lifetimes  extension  of  the  dual-self  models  allows  for  short-run 
selves who live more than a single period, and provides a natural way to capture the way 
preferences  change  as  the  “period”  becomes  shorter.  This  lets  us  explain  why 
commitments  to  avoid  far-off  temptations  are  less  costly,  and  more  attractive,  than 
commitments to avoid more imminent ones, and lets us explain the subjective interest 
rates  decline  with  delay.  The  random-lifetime  version  of  the  model  also  provides  a 
natural way to examine the effect of the length of the periods between potential decision 
nodes. This is important because the concept of a discrete time period in these decision 
problems is simply a convenient construction, and the extended model shows how the 
delay  between  consecutive  decisions  should  matter  for  whether  agents  exhibit 
“preference reversals.”  
  When the marginal cost of self-control is constant, the agent’s decision problem is  
not affected by the timing of when self-control costs are incurred, and there is no need for 
the model to track the stock of the agent’s cognitive resources: As we saw, the model 
                                                 
20 This example suggests that non-naivety is necessary to capture St. Augustine’s request “give me chastity 




with linear replenishment, benefits, and depletion is equivalent to the “state-free” model. 
However,  once  non-linearities  become  important,  so  does  the  timing  of  self-control 
decisions and  costs; the willpower stock provides a way to model the “spillover” from 
one period’s self control to future self control costs.   
  We explored some but far from all of the many possible ways to model these non-
linearities, and these is ample scope for future work on this. In particular we have looked 
for plausible properties, such as insensitivity to minor changes in timing; it would be 
useful to compile these properties in axiomatic form to better understand the universe of 
models that satisfy them. Also, it would be good to extend the qualitative analysis here by 
exploring the extent to which we can find, for each individual agent, a stable constellation 
of preference parameters that fits that agent’s quantitative behavior across a range of 
problems. This was done to a limited extent in Fudenberg and Levine [2010] for the 
model where short-run selves live a single period, not for individual subjects but for the 
median  subject  across  a  number  of  different  experiments.  However,  several  of  the 
experiments  studied  there  are  better  fit  by  allowing  short-run  selves  to  have  random 
lifetimes; for example Baucell et el [2007] show that paradoxical choices in Allais-type 
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Example 2 Extended 
Now extend the analysis of example 2 to consider the choice between consuming 
an amount at time n + ￿  and a single unit of consumption at time 1 + ￿. If the agent is 
informed of the choice at time 1 but cannot commit to a decision until time  ￿, then 
because there is a Markov solution that depends only on the current state, it follows that 
the choice will be the same as if the choice only became available in period ￿. Moreover 
because the preferences of both long-run and short-run selves are stationary, the amount 
of consumption at n + ￿  that makes the long-run self indifferent between consuming 1 




the agent indifferent between consuming 1 unit at time 1 between a unit at time 1 or 
waiting to consume more at time 1 n + .  
The situation is different when the agent can make an irrevocable choice at time 
1: the first short-run self faces a temptation cost but no other short-run self does. This 
raises the possibility that the choice may depend upon  ￿. We will compute the value of 
1 ,n c + + ￿ ￿ that makes the long run self indifferent between a unit of  consumption at time 
1 + ￿ and  1 ,n c + + ￿ ￿ units at time  n + ￿ ;  we will then use this to compute effective 
marginal interest rates on consumption.  
Observe that as in the case  1 n =  if the long-run self is indifferent between one 
unit at time 1 + ￿ and  1 ,n c + + ￿ ￿ at time n + ￿ , then since  1 µ <  the initial short-run self 
strictly prefers one unit at time  1 + ￿, so the temptation is to consume at time  1 + ￿. 
Thus  consuming  the  one  unit  at  time  1 + ￿,  incurs  no  control  cost,  so  the  long-run 
player’s utility of utility of this choice is (1 ) δ δ − ￿.  (Since the decision is taken at time 1, 
no other short-run self feels any temptation.) The initial short run self gets average value 
utility (1 )( ) δµ δµ −
￿ from consumption at time 1 + ￿, and 
1
1 , (1 )( )
n




￿ ￿ from 
the  delayed  option,  so  the  control  cost  of  the  delayed  option  is 
1
1 , (1 )( ) (1 ( ) ) n
n c δµ δµ δµ −
+ + Γ − − ￿
￿ ￿ . The direct utility of consuming  1 ,n c + + ￿ ￿ at n + ￿  
is  1
1 , (1 ) n
n c δ δ + −
+ + − ￿
￿ ￿,  so  the  reduced  form  utility  is 
( )
1 1
1 , 1 , (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 ( ) ) n n
n n c c δ δ δµ δµ δµ + − −
+ + + + − − Γ − − ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   Equating  the  present 
value  from  choosing  the  earlier  consumption  of  1  at  1 + ￿  to  that  from  1 ,n c + + ￿ ￿  at   
determines the consumption level leading to indifference. 
  1 1
1 , 1 , (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 ( ) ) n n
n n c c δ δ δ δ δµ δµ δµ + − −
+ + + + − = − − Γ − − ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Dividing both sides by δ
￿ yields 
  1 1
1 , 1 , 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ( ) ) n n
n n c c δ δ δ δµ µ δµ − −
+ + + + − = − − Γ − − ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
 so we see that the effect of moving both consumption dates forward by ￿ is to reduce the 
marginal cost of self control from Γto  µ Γ
￿. 
  We can then solve for consumption giving  
  1 , 1 1
(1 ) (1 )
((1 ) (1 ) )
n n n c
δ δµ µ
δ δ δµ µ
+ + − + −
− + Γ −
=
− + Γ −
￿




Note that this says that the effect of a delay  0 > ￿  is to decrease  the effective cost of self 
control by the factor η
￿: Intuitively, the initial short run self is less tempted as the delay 
increases so the self-control cost goes down. If we suppose that the delay is some fixed 
real time,  so the choice is between 1 unit at time t or more consumption at time t s + ,  
and send the time period to 0, the approximation used in the text shows that the marginal 
interest rate converges to  





+ Γ − + . 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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and 
0 a  is optimal for  B B ≤  , 
F a is  optimal for  B B B ≤ ≤ , and 
1 a  is optimal for 
B B ≥ . 
Proof:   
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0 a  (don’t avoid, don’t purchase) is chosen, the direct utility is 0, and the reduced 
form  utility  is  the  temptation  cost  incurred  in  the  second  period: 
0 ( ) (1 )max{0, } V B γδ δµ δµ = − − − a . 
 
3) If 
1 a  is chosen, the direct utility is 
2 (1 )( ) B δ δ δ − − , while the cost of self-control is in 
period 2 and is  (1 )min{0, } B γ δµ δµ − − −  – self-control is needed only when the short-
run player does not want to purchase. Thus 
1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )min{0, } V B B δ δ δ γδ δµ δµ = − − + − − a  
 
If B δµ ≤  as noted in the text the optimum is not to purchase and there is not temptation 
cost. So it is also not optimal to avoid in the first period, and the optimum is 
0 a . Next 
suppose that B δµ >  and consider the period 2 choice assuming the avoidance cost was 
not paid. As noted, if the purchase is not made, the average value from period 2 on is 
(1 )( ) B γ δµ δµ − − − , while if it is, the average value is (1 )( ) B δ δ − − . So the optimum 













Next observe that since B δµ >  the present value of utility from avoiding is given by  
  ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) F F B δ γ δµ δµ δµ δµ − − − − + − − .  
Then  0 ( ) ( ) F V V ≥ a a  if and only  
  
1 (1 )









Since  0 B δµ − >  this implies there is a range of sufficiently small  F  where  F a  is 
better and a range of F  so large that  0 a  is better.  
Finally, 
1 ( ) ( )
F V V ≥ a a  if  
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ) F F B B δ γ δµ δµ δµ δµ δ δ δ − − − − + − − ≥ − − ,  or 
 
2 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 (1 ) )
B F B
δ γ δµ µ δ γ δµ
δ
δ γ δµ µ δ δ γ δµ µ
− + − − + −
≤ − ≡





We conclude that 
F a  is best when  
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Straightforward algebra shows that there is a non-empty interval of B where 
F a
￿
 is best 
when  
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If  * F F >  it is not optimal to use 
F a ; in this case the optimum is determined from the 
condition for  0 1 ( ) ( ) V V ≥ a a  above. If  * F F ≤ , and if  B B ≤  then  0 ( ) ( ) F V V ≤ a a  
and  1 0 ( ) ( ) V V ≤ a a ,  so 
0 a   is  optimal;  if  B B B ≤ ≤   then  0 ( ) ( ) F V V ≥ a a   and 
1 ( ) ( ) F V V ≥ a a ,  so 
F a   is  optimal;  while  if  B B ≥   then  1 ( ) ( ) F V V ≤ a a   and 
1 0 ( ) ( ) V V ≥ a a ,  so 
1 a   is  optimal.  Finally  note  that  , * B B δµ ≤ ,  so  that  the  case 
B δµ ≤  where 
0 a  is optimal is included in this result. 
￿ 
Timing of Temptation 
  Here we consider how the timing of the foregone utility shock  n ∆  within a period 
interacts with linear replenishment. In particular we find that the timing does not matter 
when periods are small, though of course it does matter when periods are longer. 
 
Model 1:  ( ) t t t W w W κ = − −∆ ￿ ￿ , where  t ∆ ￿  is a constant flow during the period. The 
solution is  1 / exp( )( / ) t W w t w k w κ κ = −∆ − − −∆ − ￿ ￿ . For one period this gives 
2 1 0 / (1 )( / ) (1 ) w w w w w κ κτ κ λ λ ω τ ≈ −∆ − − −∆ − = + − − ∆ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
Model 2: If τ∆ ￿  is incurred at the beginning of the period, then cognitive resources jump 
down immediately from  1 w  to  1 1 w w
















λ λ τ κτ
λ λ τ
= − − − − ∆
≈ + − − ∆ + ∆





Note that this is the same as if the resources were withdrawn at the end of the period. 
  Turning from jumps to flows, we observe that if the shock ∆ is fixed rather than 
proportional to  ∆ ￿  then the difference between the terminal stocks is of order  τ  rather 
than  2 τ . However, this is consistent with the difference between discrete shocks and 
flows. In the case of shocks on order  τ ∆ ￿  there may be order  1/ n τ =  shocks per unit of 
calendar time, so that the overall error per unit of calendar time goes to zero when the 
error per period is of order  2 τ . However, fixed shocks  ∆ cannot occur too frequently, 
typically only a finite number K  of such shocks per unit of calendar time. Hence if the 
per  period  error  is  of  order  τ ,  the  error  over  calendar  time  is  of  order  Kτ ,  which 
vanishes as the length of period goes to zero. 
Proof of Theorem 5  











Then if  a  is a solution to the linear model with parameter Γ then it is a solution to the 
( , ) λ γ  model in which actions are independent of  n w  and all such solutions to the ( , ) λ γ  
model are solutions to the Γ model. 
Proof:  Recall  that  n n n w w = − ∆ ￿ .  With  linear  replenishment 
1 ( ) ( ) n n n n n n n w w w w w w w λ λ + = + − = − ∆ + − + ∆ ￿ ￿ . Define the willpower deficit 
as  n n D w w = − , then  1 (1 ) (1 ) n n n D D λ λ + = − + − ∆ . Hence 
  '
1 1 ' ' 1 (1 ) (1 )
n n n
n n n D D λ λ + = = − + − ∆ ∑ . 
Recall  that  the  average  value  of  cognitive  resources  in  the  linear  case  is 
0 (1 )
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n M w δ δ γ
∞











1 ' 1 0 ' 1
'
1 ' 0 ' 0
'




(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )




n n n n n
n n n n
n n n n n
n n n
n n n n n n









γ δ λ λ
γ δ λ λ
γ δ λ δ λ











  − = −    
  − − + − ∆ + ∆    
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we see the equivalence to the simple linear model without replenishment. 
￿ 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Proposition 7: Suppose there is increasing marginal cost of self control and there is 
strictly partial linear replenishment,  0 κ < .   Then there is  0 τ >  such that if  τ τ < ,  
there  are  0 P P τ τ > >   such  that  it  is  optimal  to  resist  forever  if  P Pτ > ,  it  is 
optimal  to  resist  until  period  ˆ 1 ∞ > > ￿   then  take  if  P P P τ τ > > ,  and  it  is 
optimal to take immediately if  P P τ > .  Let  0 0 , P P  denote the limits as  0 τ → . Let  s W  
be the solution to the differential equation 
  ( ) ( ,0)( ) t t t
f
W w W W S κ ρ η
∂
= − + +
∂∆
￿ , 
and let W∞ be the solution to  0 ( ) ( ,0)( )
f
w W W S κ ρ η ∞ ∞
∂
= − + +
∂∆
.  Then 
  ( )
0
0
( ) '( ) ( ,0) t f














( ) '( ) ( ,0) t f




∂∆ ∫  
and  if  0 0 P P P > >   then  0 ˆ ˆ lim s τ τ → = ￿  is  finite  and  strictly  positive,  and  is 
determined by  
  ( )
ˆ ˆ
0
( ) '( ) ( ,0) t t
s s
f
P S e m w e W W dt ρ κ κ ρ η
∞ − + − ∂
= + −
∂∆ ∫  
Proof: Suppose the agent resists for ￿ periods then gives in. Let  n w￿  be the corresponding 
time path of cognitive resources. Note that this is a weakly decreasing function of  ￿, 
strictly decreasing for n > ￿. The resulting average value is  
  ( )
1
1 1 0 (1 ) ( ( ,(1 )) ) ( ( )) n n
n n n n m f w S m w P δ δ δµ δ δ
− ∞
+ + = = − − + + ∑ ∑
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ , and  
the bigger is  ￿ the smaller is the first term and the larger is the second (recall that P  is 
negative). This implies that a necessary condition for an optimal  ￿ is that the value for 
1 + ￿  is no bigger, and that a sufficient condition for  1 = ￿  optimal is that the value for 
1 + ￿  is lower. Let us look at the value at ￿ minus the value at  1 + ￿   
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Note that for n ≤ ￿ we have  1
n n w w + = ￿ ￿ , so we can write this difference as  
1
1 1 1 1 1
( )
(1 ) ( ( ) ( ( ,(1 ) ))) ( ( ) ( )) n
n n n
D
m w m f w S m w m w P δ δ δµ δ
∞ − +
+ + + + = +
=
  − − − + − +     ∑




Observe that because there is partial replenishment  n w +
￿
￿  strictly decreases in ￿.  
We now use the assumption of increasing cost of self control to conclude there is 
a  τ  such that for  τ τ <  each individual term in  ( ) D ￿  is strictly increasing in  ￿, and 
hence  that  ( ) D ￿   is  strictly  increasing.    The  first  term 
1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ( ,(1 ) )) ( ( ,0)) ( ( ,(1 ) ) m w m f w S m f w m f w S δµ δµ + + + + − − = − − ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  strictly 
decreases in  1 w +
￿
￿   from  increasing marginal cost of self-control at  1 A =  and the fact 
that (1 ) 0 S δµ − →  as  0 τ → .  Since  1 w +
￿




For  the  terms  in  the  sum,  since  n   runs  from  1 + ￿   to  ∞,  the  arguments 
1
1 1 , n n w w +
+ +
￿ ￿  have the form  1
' ' , w w +
+ +
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and the former decrease with  ￿. The individual 
terms  have  the  form  1
' ' ( ) ( ) m w m w +
+ + − ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   where  1
1 1 ( ,(1 ) ) w f w S δµ +
+ + = − ￿ ￿
￿ ￿   and 
' 1
' 1 (1 ) ( ) i i w w w w λ + − +
+ + = − − − ￿ ￿ ￿
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− − − − − − − − =
+ − − + − − =
+ − − + − −
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿







where  ' 1 (1 ) A λ − = − ￿ . When τ  is small enough, increasing marginal cost of self control 
implies  that  this  is  decreasing  in  1 w +
￿
￿   and  hence  increasing  in  ￿  when  τ   is  small 
enough. 
  Notice that  n w  is bounded below by the steady state. Hence D  is bounded above 
as a function of  ￿. If  P  is large enough in absolute value (it is negative) given all the 
other  parameters  then  this  expression  is  negative  for  all  ￿,  and  it  is  optimal  to  wait 
forever;  let  Pτ   be  the  smallest  such  P   in  absolute  value.  If  P   is  small  enough  in 
absolute value, this expression is positive for all s and it is optimal to take immediately, 
let Pτ  be the largest such P  in absolute value.  
 Next we assume that τ  is small, and show that  P P τ τ > . Observe that  
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where  
  1 (1 ) [ ( ,(1 ) ] s s n s s
s n s n s s W W W f W S τ
τ τ τ τ λ δµ + −
+ + + + − = − − −  and ,  
  1 (1 ) ( )) s n s
s n s W w w W τ τ λ −




The first term of d  converges to zero as  0 τ → , and since  , m f  are differentiable the 
sum converges to  
  ( )
0
( ) ( ) '( ( )) ( ,0) t t
s s
f
d s S e m w e w W W dt ρ κ κ ρ η
∞ − + − ∂
≡ + − −
∂∆ ∫  
where  s W  is the solution to the differential equation 
  ( ) ( ,0)( ) t t t
f
W w W W S κ ρ η
∂
= − + +
∂∆
￿  
with initial condition  0 W w = . Thus we have  0 ( ) lim ( , ) d s d s τ τ → ≡ . Recall that  D  is 
strictly increasing, and that ˆ 1 = ￿  is optimal if and only if  (1) 0 D ≥ . As  0 τ →  this is 
equivalent to 
  ( )
0
( ) '( )
(0) ( ) '( ) ( ,0) ( ,0) 0
( )
t f m w f
d S e m w w dt P w ρ κ ρ η
ρ η
ρ κ
∞ − + ∂ + ∂
= − + + = − ≥
∂∆ + ∂∆ ∫   
Similarly  ˆ = ∞ ￿  is optimal if and only if lim ( ) 0 D →∞ ≤ ￿ ￿ , and so when  ( ) 0 d ∞ ≤ .  
Finally, resisting for a while and the taking, that is,  ˆ 1 < < ∞ ￿ , is optimal if and 
only if  ˆ ˆ ( 1) 0, ( ) 0 D D − ≤ ≥ ￿ ￿ , hence  ˆ ( ) 0 d s = . This gives the characterization of the 
optimum in the Proposition. Finally, the assumption that the marginal cost of self control 
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and hence  P P τ τ < must hold for all sufficiently small τ .   
￿ 
Proof of Theorem 8 
 Theorem 8: If  ( , ) ( ( ) ( , )) k k k C Y U Y U Y = Γ − a a ￿ ￿  then  ( , ) ( , ) k k C Y C Y = a a ￿ . 
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We do so by showing that we can apply the principle of optimality for the short-run self  
to compute the opportunity cost as a sum of current and future foregone utilities, then 
rearrange the resulting sum to get the desired result. As noted in the text, the principle of 
optimality  for  the  short-run  self  gives  the  opportunity  cost  as  a  sum  of  weighted 
increments: 
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Writing out the full average present value of opportunity costs we can in turn express that 
as a weighted sum of foregone utilities. 
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Set  " ' = + ￿ ￿ ￿ . The final step is to rearrange this sum of increments to get the recursive 
cost 
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which is the desired result. 
 
 